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During the jury selection process, litigants are entitled to exercise an
unlimited number of challenges for cause, removing venirepersons who
are unlikely to be fair and impartial jurors in the particular case.'
The procedure for these challenges requires that the lawyer specify
the reasons for the challenge, and that the trial judge ultimately rule upon
the legitimacy of the challenge. 2 The litigants are also entitled to exercise
peremptory challenges. In contrast to challenges for cause, the number of
peremptory challenges available to a party is limited by statute or rule, and
the lawyers need not state the grounds for peremptory challenges.3
Because peremptory challenges are exercised after the challenges for
cause, any prospective juror who is peremptorily struck is presumably an
individual who is not subject to a valid challenge for cause. For this reason,
and also for the reason that lawyers typically have limited information con-
cerning prospective jurors, peremptory challenges are frequently exercised
on the basis of group affiliations rather than individual characteristics. 4 In-
deed, evaluating people on the basis of stereotypes is an inherent aspect of
the peremptory challenge system.5 The peremptory challenge system al-
lows lawyers and litigants to impose these stereotypes upon the jury selec-
tion process without articulating these potentially offensive and divisive
prejudices.6
There is no federal constitutional right to exercise peremptory chal-
lenges.7 Nevertheless, peremptory challenges have long been considered
to be an essential component of the jury trial system.s In fact, the federal
and every state jury selection scheme includes some provision for peremp-
* Professor of Law, Albany Law School of Union University. BA., Yale University (1976);
J.D., New York University School of Law (1979). The author gratefully acknowledges the
contributions of Maureen Sladek, Jill Bolton, Thomas Reh, Mary Ellen Ladouceur and Kamayo
Smith to this article.
1 JACK H. FMIEDENTHAL ET AL, CVIL PROCEDURE § 11.10 (1985).
2 I.
3 Id.
4 Stephen A. Saltzburg & Mary Ellen Powers, Peremptoy Challenges and the Clash between Impar-
tiality and Group Representation, 41 MD. L. REv. 387, 342 (1982); Roger S. Kuhn,Jury Discrimination:
The Next Phase, 41 S. CAL. L. REv. 235, 287 n.211 (1968).
5 Raymond J. Broderick, Why the Peremptory Challenge Should Be Abolished, 65 TEmp. L. REv.
869, 370 (1992); Saltzburg & Powers, supra note 4, at 373.
6 Saltzburg & Powers, supra note 4, at 356; Barbara Allen Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving "Its
Wonderful Power," 27 STAN. L. REv. 545, 553-54 (1975).
7 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 91 (1986); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965);
Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919).
8 E.g., Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894); Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S.
370, 376 (1892).
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tory challenges.9 The exalted status of the peremptory challenge has never
been better illustrated than in Swain v. Alabama,10 in which the Court up-
held a conviction against the black petitioner's claim that he had been de-
nied equal protection" by the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges
to remove all six remaining black venirepersons. The Swain Court ac-
knowledged that peremptory challenges are "frequently exercised on
grounds normally thought irrelevant to legal proceedings or official action,
namely, the race, religion, nationality, occupation or affiliations of people
summoned for jury duty," and concluded that it could not "hold that the
striking of Negroes in a particular case is a denial of equal protection of the
laws."'
2
Twenty-one years later, in Batson v. Kentucky,'3 the Court revisited the
issue presented in Swain. While the Court sought to preserve the peremp-
tory challenge system, it did hold that the exercise of peremptory chal-
lenges in a particular case based upon the race of the venireperson is a
denial of equal protection.' 4 The Batson Court specifically held that, in
cases in which a criminal defendant establishes a prima facie case of pur-
poseful racial discrimination in the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory
challenges, the state must offer satisfactory neutral explanations for chal-
lenging black venirepersons.' 5
In the years since the Batson decision was handed down, a number of
developments have occurred. First, the Court has expanded the applica-
tion of Batson beyond its original sphere and correspondingly made further
inroads upon the previously impregnable realm of the peremptory chal-
lenge. Second, lower courts have had the opportunity, or perhaps task, of
implementing Batson, refining Batson's general dictates about "prima facie
case[s]" of discrimination and "neutral explanations." 16 Third, and per-
haps most interestingly, in cases in which Batson's requirement of "neutral
explanations" has applied, we have been given a window into a previously
secret arena; the thought processes of lawyers in the use of peremptory
challenges.
This article examines each of these developments. In examining Bat-
son as applied, the article considers virtually every relevant reported deci-
sion of every federal and state court applying Batson between April 30, 1986
(the date of the Batson decision) and December 31, 1993. Part I of this
article reviews the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Batson
and its progeny and explores the implications of these decisions for the
continuing vitality of the peremptory challenge. Part II of this article ex-
amines the cases in which Batson has been applied from 1986 through 1993
and investigates whether the Court's ambition of simultaneously preserving
9 Brian E. Leach, Comment, Extending Batson v. Kentucky to Gender and Beyond: The Death
Knell for the Peremptory Challenge?, 19 S. ILL. U. LJ. 381, 384 (1995).
10 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
11 "No state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
12 Swain, 380 U.S. at 220-21.
13 476 U.S. 79 (1986).





the peremptory challenge and outlawing racial discrimination injury selec-
tion has proved successful. Part III looks at the individual explanations for
peremptory challenges which have been articulated under the Batson
formula and, in light of these and other considerations, inquires whether
the peremptory challenge is a device worth preserving.
I. BA TSON IN THE SUPREME COURT
"Discrimination" is a curious word, and Batson is a curious decision
about discrimination. The word "discrimination" is defined as "the making
or perceiving of a distinction or difference."17 The word is qualitatively
neutral.' 8 Thus, the entire process of jury selection is one of discrimina-
tion. The real issue is whether the criteria upon which the discriminations
are based are reasonable and acceptable.' 9
In Batson, the Court, of course, told us that race is not a reasonable or
acceptable criterion for discrimination in the exercise of peremptory chal-
lenges. But the Batson Court did not purport to announce this rule; this is
a rule that was supposedly already in place at the time of Swain.20 Batson,
according to the Batson Court, parted company with Swain only insofar as it
allowed a criminal defendant to establish a prima facie case of purposeful
racial discrimination based upon the exercise of peremptory challenges in
a single case, rather than by showing a pattern over many cases.2 ' But in
this regard, the Batson Court was far too modest.
The petitioner in Swain actually raised three challenges to the Ala-
bama jury selection procedure used in obtaining his conviction. First, the
petitioner challenged the process by which venirepersons were selected.22
Second, the petitioner challenged the fact that the prosecutor used per-
emptory challenges to remove all six remaining black venirepersons in the
petitioner's trial 23 And third, the petitioner claimed that prosecutors in
Talladega County systematically used peremptory challenges to remove
black venirepersons, as evidenced by the fact that no black venireperson
had ever served on a petit jury in Talladega County, despite the fact that
blacks had constituted significant portions of venires.2 4
The Swain Court's rejection of the petitioner's second claim was not
premised upon the inadequacy of the petitioner's evidence that the prose-
cutor's peremptory challenges were racially motivated. Instead, Swain
made clear that, as long as the racially motivated peremptory challenges
were designed to secure a favorable jury in the case at hand, such chal-
lenges were perfectly acceptable. For if the Swain majority meant to make
17 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DIcTIoNARY 648 (1986).
18 While this is certainly true as a technical matter, the word "discrimination" undoubtedly
takes on quite different qualitative connotations in different contexts. Thus, most people would
be flattered to be described as discriminating buyers, but equally offended to be reputed to be
discriminating employers.
19 See Kuhn, supra note 4, at 240.
20 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84 (1986).
21 Id. at 90-93.
22 Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 205-09 (1965).
23 1d at 209-10.
24 Id. at 222-23.
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clear, as the Batson majority later would, that racially motivated peremptory
challenges were not an acceptable form of discrimination, why did they
specifically endorse the exercise of peremptory challenges on the basis of
"race, religion, nationality, occupation or [group] affiliations"?25 Indeed,
in rejecting the petitioner's second claim, the Swain Court specifically held
that it could not "hold that the striking of Negroes in a particular case is a
denial of equal protection of the laws. In the quest for an impartial and
qualified jury, Negro and white, Protestant and Catholic, are alike subject
to being challenged without cause." 26
Thus, contrary to the historically revisionist view in Batson, Swain was
not a case which found any constitutional flaw with the exercise of racially
motivated peremptory challenges for case-specific reasons, such as the
striking of venirepersons who shared the same race as the defendant. Any
doubt as to this conclusion vanishes upon an examination of the Swain
Court's disposition of the petitioner's third claim: the allegation that prose-
cutors systematically used peremptory challenges to remove black
venirepersons in all cases.27 Because this claim, unlike the petitioner's sec-
ond claim, suggested that prosecutors used racially-motivated peremptory
challenges even in cases in which the exclusion of blacks provided no tacti-
cal advantage to the state, it "raise[d] a different issue."28 In the words of
the Swain majority,
We have decided that it is permissible to insulate from inquiry the re-
moval of Negroes from a particularjuy on the assumption that the prosecutor is
acting on acceptable considerations related to the case he is trying, the particular
defendant involved and the particular crime charged. But when the prosecutor
in a county, in case after case, whatever the circumstances, whatever the
crime and whoever the defendant or victim may be, is responsible for the
removal of Negroes who have been selected as qualified jurors by the jury
commissioners and who have survived challenges for cause, with the re-
sult that no Negroes ever serve on petit juries, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment claim takes on added significance.... Such proof might support a
reasonable inference that Negroes are excluded from juries for reasons
wholly unrelated to the outcome of the particular case on trial and that the per-
emptory system is being used to deny the Negro the same right and op-
portunity to participate in the administration of justice enjoyed by the
white population.
29
25 Id. at 220.
26 Id. at 221. In this respect, the Swain majority opinion bears a striking resemblance to the
dissenting opinion of Justice Rehnquist in Batson:
In my view, there is simply nothing "unequal" about the State's using its peremptory
challenges to strike blacks from the jury in cases involving black defendants, so long as
such challenges are also used to exclude whites in cases involving white defendants,
Hispanics in cases involving Hispanic defendants, Asians in cases involving Asian de-
fendants, and so on. This case-specific use of peremptory challenges by the state does
not single out blacks, or members of any other race for that matter, for discriminatory
treatment.
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 137-38 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
27 Swain, 380 U.S. at 222-23.
28 Id. at 223.
29 Id. at 223-24 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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In fact, it is only this third claim of the petitioner in Swain which failed
because of a failure of proof to support the petitioner's allegations.3 0
Thus, while the Batson Court characterized its decision as merely over-
ruling Swain as to the "evidentiary formulation" necessary to establish ra-
cially motivated discrimination,3' the truth is that Batson. radically
recharacterized a form of discrimination, previously endorsed in Swain, as
a violation of equal protection.3 2
Batson accomplished this objective by creating a two-step procedure.
First, the criminal defendant must establish a prima facie case of pur-
poseful racial discrimination in the exercise of the prosecutor's peremp-
tory challenges.33 To meet this burden, the defendant must first establish
"that he is a member of a cognizable racial group and that the prosecutor
has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members
of the defendant's race."m Beyond that, the defendant must point to facts,
such as a pattern of peremptory strikes by the prosecutor or the prosecu-
tor's questions and statements during voir dire, which "raise an inference
that the prosecutor used [the state's peremptory challenges] to exclude
the veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race."35
If the trial judge is satisfied that the defendant has established a prima
facie case, "the burden shifts to the State to come forward with a neutral
explanation for challenging blackjurors."3 6 This explanation need not rise
to the level of establishing a valid challenge for cause,37 but the prosecutor
must do more than merely deny a racial motive.38 In particular, "the prose-
cutor may not rebut the defendant's prima facie case of discrimination by
stating merely that he challenged jurors of the defendant's race on the
assumption-or his intuitive judgment-that they would be partial to the
30 Id. at 224-26.
31 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 93 (1986).
32 By characterizing the Batson decision as a mere evidentiary adjustment rather than a major
substantive change in the definition of impermissible discrimination, the Batson Court managed
to blithely ignore the havoc that Batson played with prosecutorial peremptory challenges. Batson
essentially told prosecutors that they knew all along that, as a matter of constitutional law, race
should not be a basis for their peremptory challenges, but that now they might well be called
upon to explain their peremptory challenges to insure constitutional compliance. In many such
cases, in which prosecutors struggled to find race-neutral reasons for their peremptory chal-
lenges, the truth was that venirepersons had been struck precisely because, in whole or in part,
they shared the same race as the defendant. Satzburg & Powers, supra note 4, at 364-65. Cf
Kuhn, supra note 4, at 284-85. And prosecutors had done so, not because the relatively relaxed
evidentiary standard of Swain made it easy to avoid detection, but rather because Swain had en-
dorsed this type of case-specific discrimination as an entirely appropriate use of the peremptory
challenge. This problem was only exacerbated when Batson was held to be applicable to all cases
pending on direct review or not yet final at the time of the Court's decision in Batson, Griffith v.
Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987), hinging the preservation of convictions upon the "recollection" of
race-neutral reasons that prosecutors, at the time the peremptory challenges were exercised, did
not then know were required.
33 Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.
34 Id. ,(citation omitted).
35 Id. at 96-97.
36 Id. at 97. More recently, in Purkett v. Elem, 115 S. Ct. 1769, 1771 (1995), the Court deter-
mined that such an explanation need not be "persuasive, or even plausible." If the explanation
offered is facially valid, i.e., discriminatory intent is not inherent in the explanation, the burden
shifts back to the party raising the Batson challenge to prove purposeful discrimination. Id.
37 Batson, 476 U.S. at 97.
38 Id.
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defendant because of their shared race."3 9 This is because Batson radically
departs from Swain in holding that "the Equal Protection
Clause... forbids the States to strike black veniremen on the assumption
that they will be biased in a particular case simply because the defendant is
black."4
0
By virtue of the Batson Court's failure to recognize, or at least acknowl-
edge, its substantial departure from Swain, the Court simply avoided ex-
plaining why it is that "same-race-as-the-defendant" peremptory challenges
violate equal protection. Certainly, reliance upon stereotypes is a virtually
inherent aspect of a system of peremptory challenges. 41 Was the Batson
Court suggesting that the stereotypical assumption of same-race sympathy
for the defendant is factually invalid? Although the evidence supporting
such an assumption is controversial and questionable, 42 there is certainly
some support for the proposition that jurors are more sympathetic to de-
fendants of their same race. 43 Moreover, if the "same-race-as-the-defend-
ant" theory is false, then how is the black defendant harmed when the
prosecutor uses peremptory challenges to remove black venirepersons?44
To the extent that Batson is motivated by a desire to insure that black de-
fendants do not suffer the consequences of verdicts by juries with inade-
quate black representation, that concern makes no sense if the racial
identity of the defendant and the jurors is immaterial to such verdicts.45 If
Batson is motivated by a concern for the criminal defendant, the irony is
that such concern is premised upon the very same racial stereotype which
Batson pronounces to be unconstitutional in the context of the peremptory
challenge.
If there is a consistent logic to Batson, it can only be discovered by
identifying the true intended beneficiaries of that decision. Prior to Batson,
39 Id. (citation omitted).
40 Id.
41 Saltzburg & Powers, supra note 4, at 382.
42 Barbara D. Underwood, Ending Race Discrimination injury Selection: Whose Right Is it, Any-
way , 92 COLUM. L. Rnv. 725, 731-32 (1992).
43 See, e.g., JON M. VAN DYKE, JuRY SELECTION PROCEDURES, 10 (1977); Douglas L. Colbert,
Challenging the Challenge: Thirteenth Amendment as a Prohibition Against the Racial Use of Peremptory
Challenges, 76 CoRNEiLL L. REv. 1, 5 n.12 (1990). See Saltzburg & Powers, supra note 4, at 370.
Indeed, given the extent to which peremptory challenges are exercised on the basis of stereo-
types, Batson arguably disallows the stereotype that litigants believe to be the most valid. See also
Saltzburg & Powers, supra note 4, at 366-67, 373-74. For example, prior to the selection of the
jury in the 0. J. Simpson murder trial, "the Field Poll, a leading California opinion research
agency, reported that while 62 percent of whites believed that Mr. Simpson was 'very likely or
somewhat likely' guilty, only 38 percent of blacks agreed with them." Seth Mydans, In Simpson
Case, an Issue for Everyone N.Y. TiMEs, July 22, 1994, at A4. Even after much of the evidence had
been presented by the state in the Simpson case, an Associated Press poll revealed that "[b] lacks
are about four times as likely as whites to doubt the charges." Howard Goldberg, Poll: Few Doubt
Simpson's Guilt, But A Third Would Oppose Retria ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER, May 29, 1995, at A10.
44 The theory might be that the problem for the black defendant is the racial bias of an all-
white jury, not the loss of supposedly sympathetic blackjurors. But we need not resolve the issue
of who is biased and who is fair in absolute terms to reach some very simple conclusions. First, if
a prosecutor seeking a conviction of a black defendant benefits from the removal of blacks from
the jury, then that same defendant benefits from the inclusion of those same black jurors. Sec-
ond, if a black defendant seeking acquittal benefits from the inclusion of black jurors, then a
prosecutor seeking a conviction benefits from the exclusion of those same black jurors.
45 See Underwood, supra note 42, at 733; Michael A. Cressler, Powers v. Ohio: The Death Knell
for the Peremptory Challenget, 28 IDAHo L. REv. 349, 380 (1991-92).
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there could be no serious dispute that the primary purpose of jury selec-
tion procedures in general, and of peremptory challenges in particular, was
to protect the litigants, not the potential jurors. 46 In the exercise of per-
emptory challenges, the lawyers, of course, seek not an impartial jury, but
rather jurors most favorable to their client's interests.47 As long as the va-
lidity of peremptory challenges was measured by the primary directive of
protecting litigants' interests, nondiscriminatory jury selection could never
be a realistic consideration.
48
. The fact is that Batson only makes analytical sense if one recognizes
that it has shifted the primary focus from the rights of the litigants to the
rights of prospective jurors.49 Batson is only able to depart so dramatically
from Swain because it stands for the proposition that, at least in the context
of racial discrimination, the rights of citizens to participate in their govern-
ment, and in particular the right to participate by service on juries, out-
weighs the rights of litigants to remove jurors without cause. Any group of
citizens which suffers exclusion from the jury system is marked as inferior
and publicly humiliated, and is thereby alienated from its own govern-
ment's process. 50 At least in cases in which such an exclusion is based
upon race, the right of such citizens to equal protection is violated.
51
Subsequent decisions of the Court expanding the application of Batson
have illustrated even more clearly that the Batson rule is one that is neces-
sarily designed primarily to guarantee equal treatment for potential jurors.
In Powers v. Ohio,52 the Court dispensed with one of Batson's requirements,
holding that a white criminal defendant could raise a Batson challenge to
the exclusion of black venirepersons. Acknowledging that the Batson opin-
ion had addressed the harm to the defendant caused by the prosecutor's
exclusion ofjurors of the defendant's race,53 the Powers Court focused in-
stead upon the right of potential jurors to avoid exclusion on the basis of
race.5
4
46 See Kuhn, supra note 4, at 273.
47 Karen M. Bray, Reaching the Final Chapter in the Story of Peremptory Challenges, 40 UCLA L.
REv. 517, 559 (1992); Kuhn, supra note 4, at 286.
48 Kuhn supra note 4, at 287.
49 See Leach, supra note 9, at 399-400; Underwood, supra note 42, at 726-27, 730-31, 774.
50 Broderick, supra note 5, at 370-71, 405, 418.
51 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986). Although the Court in Batson thus acknowl-
edged that the right of potential jurors was a component of the Court's analysis, the bulk of the
Court's opinion focuses upon the Court's conclusion that "[t]he Equal Protection Clause guaran-
tees the defendant that the State will not exclude members of his race from the jury venire on
account of race .... " Id. at 86 (citation omitted). As discussed in the text, this emphasis upon
the defendants' right is misplaced. Indeed, if the primary concern is truly that a black defendant
will suffer the consequences of insufficient black representation on the jury, then the focus ought
to be on the actual composition of such juries and not upon the selection process. See Under-
wood, supra note 42, at 730-31. The failure of the Court in Batson to make clear that the primary
emphasis must logically be on the right of potential jurors has, as will be demonstrated, contrib-
uted to a great deal of confusion in the implementation of Batson. In particular, the Batson
Court's emphasis upon the defendants' right has led some courts, in evaluating whether a de-
fendant has made a prima facie showing of a Batson violation, to focus upon the racial composi-
tion of the selected jury and not upon the racial identity of the venirepersons excluded by the
prosecutors' peremptory challenges. See infra notes 87-92 and accompanying text.
52 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
53 Id. at 406.
54 Id. at 406-10. Obviously, the white defendant in Powers did not suffer the same potential
harm suffered by one who has venirepersons of the same race excluded. Nevertheless, the Court
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In Georgia v. McCollum,55 the Court extended Batson to the exercise of
peremptory challenges by a criminal defendant.5 6 In this context, there
could be no constitutional concern for the party raising the Batson chal-
lenge, for the government has no constitutional right to equal protection.
As a matter of constitutional law, then, McCollum represents a shift from
Batson's primary focus on the right of a defendant to a fair trial to an exclu-
sive focus on the venirepersons' right to racially-neutral jury selection pro-
cedures.57 By its decision in McCollum, the Court has elevated this 'Jurors'
right" to a position superior even to the criminal defendant's unfettered
use of peremptory challenges to select an impartial jury:
We do not believe that this decision will undermine the contribution of
the peremptory challenge to the administration ofjustice. Nonetheless,
"if race stereotypes are the price for acceptance of ajury panel as fair," we
reaffirm today that such a "price is too high to meet the standard of the
Constitution." It is an affront to justice to argue that a fair trial includes
the right to discriminate against a group of citizens based upon their
race.
58
By the time of McCollum, the Batson rule had evolved such that the
formerly unassailable fortress surrounding the peremptory challenge had
been seriously eroded in at least three respects. First, at least with regard to
racial stereotypes, the racial identity of the juror with that of a party or
other significant person in the litigation had become no longer a permissi-
ble basis for the exercise of a peremptory challenge. Second, the rationale
for the Batson rule had become focused upon the right of potential jurors
not to be blocked from jury service because of race. And third, this right
had ascended to a position superior even to the rights of private litigants,
including criminal defendants, to the unexamined use of peremptory
challenges.
One further expansion of Batson, with a corresponding limitation
upon the historical autonomy of the peremptory challenge, occurred even
after McCollum. In f E. B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.,59 the Court extended
found that such a defendant suffers a sufficient injury to merit standing to raise the equal protec-
tion claims on behalf of the excluded jurors. Id. at 410-16.
55 505 U.S. 42 (1992).
56 Id. at 58-59. A necessary component of this decision was the conclusion that the defend-
ant's exercise of peremptory challenges constituted state action for the purpose of the applica-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 51-55. This conclusion
was substantially predetermined by the Court's decision in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,
500 U.S. 614 (1991), holding that Batson applies to peremptory challenges exercised by private
litigants in civil cases.
57 See Deborah Zalesne &Kinney Zalesne, Saving the Peremptory Challenge: The Case for a Narrow
Interpretation of McCollum, 70 DENy. U. L. Rav. 313, 326, 328 (1993). As a practical matter, the
decision in McCollum may well have been influenced by the consequences of prohibiting only one
side in a criminal case from using race-based peremptory challenges. For example, in McCollum,
three white defendants were charged with assaulting two black victims. If the proscriptions of
Batson applied only to the government, then defense counsel of a mind to secure an all-white jury
could almost certainly accomplish that goal. In such circumstances, assuming that there is some
merit to the perception that the racial identity of the jurors with the litigants is of some signifi-
cance, the government would be unfairly prejudiced.
58 McCollum, 505 U.S. at 57 (citations omitted).
59 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994).
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Batson to the use of peremptory challenges based upon gender.60 The
Court reasoned that, because distinctions based upon gender, like race,
require a level of heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, 61
and because individuals enjoy constitutional protection from such unac-
ceptably discriminatory jury selection criteria,62 gender cannot be an ac-
ceptable basis for the exercise of peremptory challenges. Even if there
exists some support for the stereotypes underlying gender-based peremp-
tory challenges, such action remains constitutionally unacceptable. 63
The extension of Batson to gender is consistent with the premise that it
is the right of potential jurors which has assumed prominence in the Batson
analysis. Because the number of peremptory challenges available to a law-
yer is limited, a lawyer seeking to remove all members of a particular group
from participation on ajury is not likely to be successful unless members of
that group constitute a small portion of the venire. In most cases, mem-
bers of a particular group will constitute a small portion of the venire only
where the members of that group correspondingly constitute a small por-
tion of the general population of the jurisdiction from which the venire is
chosen. Thus, the use of peremptory challenges has a particular impact
upon minority racial groups, because it was, prior to Batson at least, often
possible to eliminate members of such groups from the jury selection pro-
cess by the use of peremptory challenges.6 By contrast, it is far less likely
that either men or women as a group will constitute a sufficiently small
percentage of a particular venire such that a lawyer's use of peremptory
challenges could effectively eliminate the presence of members of a partic-
ular gender on an individual jury. Nevertheless, the harm caused to indi-
vidual prospective jurors who are denied participation in the criminal
adjudicatory process based on their gender has been of sufficient concern
to the Court to warrant this further limitation upon the peremptory
challenge.
Throughout the evolution of the Batson doctrine, the Court has in-
sisted that the limitations placed upon the peremptory challenge system
have not been intended to eliminate, and will not have the effect of elimi-
nating, the peremptory challenge. 65 The Court has also expressed its con-
fidence in the abilities of the lower courts to implement the Batson
procedures in order to accommodate the Batson objectives while preserving
60 Id. at 1421.
61 Id. at 1424-25. This heightened scrutiny is premised upon the history of race-based and
gender-based discrimination in this country. Id. Thus, Batson and its progeny erect no barrier to
the exercise of peremptory challenges on the basis of stereotypes or classifications which do not
reinforce historical denials of fundamental opportunities. Id. at 1428 n.14. InJ. E. B., the Court
specifically endorsed the use .of peremptory challenges on the basis of group discriminations
which have received only the lower, "rational basis" level of scrutiny under the Court's equal
protection analysis. Id. at 1429. Thus, in addition to race and gender, national origin and reli-
gion are apparently prohibited stereotypes under Batson; but age, disability, occupation, educa-
tion and wealth are probably permissible criteria. Underwood, supra note 42, at 764-66 & nn.
172-79.
'62 J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1427-28, 1430.
63 Id. at 1427 n.11.
64 Kuhn, supra note 4, at 287.
65 . E. B., 114 S. Ct. at 1429; Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 57-58 (1992); Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98-99 (1986).
1996]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
the proper use of the peremptory challenge. 66 Whether the Court's hopes
and expectations have proven to be true is the subject of the empirical
analysis in the next section.
II. BA TSO IN PRACTICE
As noted earlier, this section examines Batson in practice by examining
the published decisions of federal and state courts between April 30, 1986,
(the date of the Batson decision) and the end of calendar year 1993 (here-
inafter "survey period").67
66 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 631 (1991); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S.
400, 416 (1991); Batson, 476 U.S. at 99.
67 Some explanation should be given about criteria and methodology. Substantial effort has
been made to include every published decision within the specified time period. Because it is
very unlikely that no cases have fallen through the cracks, this goal undoubtedly has not been
accomplished. Nevertheless, the real objective has been to collect a substantial data base, both in
terms of sheer numbers of cases and in terms of a substantial percentage of all relevant cases, and
that goal surely has been accomplished. If a lower court decision was reviewed on appeal, then
that particular litigation has been considered only one "case" for purposes of the data. If a lower
court decision was reversed on appeal, the lower court decision has been disregarded to the
extent of the reversal.
In analyzing the cases, each decision has been examined for its conclusion as to whether a
prima facie case had been established and whether the proffered explanations, if any, were found
to be neutral and acceptable. This sometimes created interpretive problems and required case-
specific judgments. In many cases, the courts explicitly or implicitly assumed the existence of a
prima facie case arguendo. See, e.g., Alan Raphael, DiscriminatoyJury Selection: Lower Court Imple-
mentation of Batson v. Kentucky, 25 WiLLAmrrE L. REv. 293, 310 (1989). In such instances, the
decisions have not been included in any compilations concerning the establishment of a prima
facie case. In some cases, the court's conclusion as to the establishment of a prima facie case was
not clear because the court proceeded immediately to examine the adequacy of the proffered
explanations. These have been generally excluded from any compilations regarding the prima
facie case prong of Batson, with two exceptions: cases in which the opinion fairly allows for the
conclusion that the court had implicitly found that prima facie cases had been established; and,
those cases in which the court ultimately found a Batson violation, thus indicating an implicit
finding of a prima facie case.
Some interpretive problems were also presented by state court decisions following proce-
dures slightly at variance with those specified in Batson. In fact, several state courts had enacted
rules similar or identical to Batson even prior to the Batson decision. See, e.g., State v. Neil, 457 So.
2d 481 (Fla. 1984); People v. Thompson, 435 N.Y.S.2d 739 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981); State v. Crespin,
612 P.2d 716 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980); Commonwealth v. Soares, 387 N.E.2d 499 (Mass. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979); People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748 (Cal. 1978). In one state, for exam-
ple, the trial courts have been required to consider the proffered neutral explanations as a factor
in determining the existence of a prima facie case. State v. Antwine, 743 S.W.2d 51 (Mo. 1987),
cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1017 (1988). Decisions following such a procedure have been included only
to the extent that the results can be measured in accordance with the usual Batson procedural
steps, which occasionally required some interpretation and judgment.
In addition, no attempt has been made to distinguish between rules of decision and dicta.
For example, if a decision indicates that no prima facie case had been established and that,
nevertheless, the proffered explanations were satisfactory, each of these conclusions would be
treated as having been established by the case, even though the second conclusion was not neces-
sary for the ultimate decision of the court.
Finally, it must be recognized that the data is somewhat self-selective because it consists solely
of published decisions on the Batson issue. How many unreported Batson decisions there are,
what the results of those decisions are, and how the inclusion of that information might have
altered the information gathered here are all matters of speculation.
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A. Which Parties Make Batson Claims?
Although the opportunity to make a Batson claim is now available to all
parties in both criminal and civil cases, the fact is that Batson is a tool used
almost exclusively by criminal defendants. Table A-1 indicates the parties




Criminal Defendants68  1101 95.24%
Prosecutors69  18 1.56%
Civil Plaintiffs 28 2.42%
Civil Defendants 9 0.78%
Total 1156 100.00%
It is true, of course, that the Supreme Court did not extend Batson to
civil cases until June 3, 1991.70 It is also true that the Supreme Court did
not extend the obligations to comply with Batson to the criminal defense
until June 18, 1992.71 Nevertheless, the data indicates that these expan-
sions of Batson have not had a significant impact on the virtual monopoly
of Batson claims by criminal defendants. Table A-2 indicates the identities
of the Batson complainants prior to the extension of Batson to civil litigants.
TABLE A-2
BATsoNCoMPLAINANTS (April 30, 1986, through June 3, 1991)
Number Percentage
Criminal Defendants 685 97.58%
Prosecutors 5 0.71%
Civil Plaintiffs 9 1.29%
Civil Defendants 3 0.43%
Total 702 100.00%
By comparison, Table A-3 indicates the party status of the Batson com-
plainants after Batson was extended to civil litigants by the Supreme Court.
68 This category includes plaintiffs in habeas corpus proceedings seeking to overturn
convictions.
69 This category includes defendants in habeas corpus proceedings seeking to overturn
convictions.
70 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
71 Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992).
1996]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
TABLE A-3
BA TsooN COMPLAINANTS
(June 4, 1991, through December 31, 1993)
Number Percentage
Criminal Defendants 416 91.63%
Prosecutors 13 2.86%
Civil Plaintiffs 19 4.19%
Civil Defendants 6 1.32%
Total 454 100.00%
Prior to Edmonson, civil litigants thus constituted only 1.72% of Batson
complainants. After Edmonson, but still during the survey period, civil liti-
gants constituted 5.5% of Batson complainants, an increase but still a quite
small portion of the Batson complainants.
The effect of extending Batson to the peremptory challenges exercised
by criminal defendants has been equally unimpressive. Table A-4 details
the breakdown of Batson complainants prior to the Court's decision in Mc-
Collum extending Batson to criminal defendants.
TABLE A-4
BATSON COMPLAINANTS (April 30, 1986, through June 18, 1992)
Number Percentage
Criminal Defendants 914 96.82%
Prosecutors 9 0.95%
Civil Plaintiffs 18 1.91%
Civil Defendants 3 0.32%
Total 944 100.00%
By comparison, Table A-5 details the same data for the survey period
after the McCollum decision.
TABLE A-5
BA TSON COMPLAINANTS
(June 19, 1992, through December 31, 1993)
Number Percentage
Criminal Defendants 187 88.20%
Prosecutors 9 4.25%
Civil Plaintiffs 10 4.72%




The percentage of Batson complainants who were prosecutors in-
creased from 0.95% prior to McCollum to 4.23% after McCollum, but the
portion of Batson complainants who have been prosecutors has remained
very small.
The data thus indicates that, in practice, Batson remains a tool used
almost exclusively by criminal defendants. Whether this is because prose-
cutors are especially prone to violate Batson's directive or should be ex-
plained otherwise remains to be seen.
B. Which Parties Make Successful Batson Claims?
Table B-1 examines all cases within the survey period which came to
some conclusive resolution and details the success rate by category of
litigant.
TABLE B-i
PREVAILING COMPLAINANTS BY PARTIES
Successful Unsuccessful Success Rate
Criminal Defendants 165 875 15.87%
Prosecutors 11 2 84.62%
Civil Plaintiffs 11 15 42.31%
Civil Defendants 4 3 57.14%
Total 191 895 17.59%
Although criminal defendants monopolize the making of Batson
claims, the success rate of such claims by criminal defendants is manifestly
unimpressive, especially as contrasted with the success rates of other cate-
gories of litigants. Of course, the number of claims made by the other
parties is very small, and perhaps is not statistically significant. This is per-
haps because it will take some time for these other groups to "catch on" to
the availability of Batson as an affirmative device. It may also be that these
parties, prosecutors in particular, are institutionally more selective about
making the type of allegations inherent in a Batson challenge.
Not to be lost in a focus upon the success rates is the significance of
the raw numbers. During the survey period, 191 lawyers were found to
have violated the rule of law announced in Batson. Of these, 165, or over
86%, have been prosecutors, supposedly a subdivision of the bar having
special ethical obligations to uphold the law and seek justice.72 The
number of prosecutors who have been determined to have acted in viola-
tion of the law as set down in Batson is a dismal report card on this particu-
lar aspect of this obligation.
72 See MODEL RuLEs OF PROFSSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8 cmt. (1991).
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C. Which Parties are Successful in Establishing a Prima Facie Case?
Table C-1 indicates the number of Batson complainants, broken down
by parties, who have been successful in establishing a prima facie case, the
first step in a Batson complaint.
TABLE C-1
ESTABLISHING A PimMA FAcIE CASE BY PARTIES
Successful Unsuccessful Success Rate
Criminal Defendants 480 312 60.61%
Prosecutors 14 0 100.00%
Civil Plaintiffs 20 2 90.91%
Civil Defendants 5 1 83.33%
Total 519 315 62.23%
Once again, criminal defendants predominate, but the success rate of
criminal defendants is significantly lower than the success rates for the
other categories of litigants.
Also of interest is a comparison of the success rates in establishing a
prima facie case with the success rates in establishing a Batson violation.
This data is summarized in Table C-2.
TABLE C-2
SUCCESS RATES BY PARTIES
Prima Facie Cases Batson Violations
Criminal Defendants 60.61% 15.87%
Prosecutors 100.00% 84.62%
Civil Plaintiffs 90.91% 42.31%
Civil Defendants 83.33% 57.14%
Total 62.23% 17.59%
This information suggests that it is relatively easy for a Batson com-
plainant to establish a prima facie case, but that it is much more difficult
ultimately to prevail on a Batson challenge. There are several possible ex-
planations for this. First, courts may be very liberal in finding that a prima
facie case has been established. 73 The reason for this may be because the
consequence of the establishment of a prima facie case is merely to require
the responding party to offer neutral explanations for the targeted per-
emptory challenges. A second possibility is that it is too easy for the re-
sponding party to offer neutral explanations, 74 and hence it is too difficult
73 See Brian J. Serr & Mark Maney, Racism, Peremptory Challenges, and the Democratic Jury: The
Jurisprudence of a Delicate Balance, 79J. CrM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 60, 62-63 (1988).
74 See, e.g.,James R. Acker, Exercising Peremptory Challenges After Batson, 24 CRIM. L. BuLL. 187,
197 (1988); Serr & Maney, supra note 73, at 43, 47, 62-63.
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for Batson complainants ultimately to prevail. Of course, a third possibility
is that the prima facie case threshold was intended to be a relatively low
hurdle, and therefore the discrepancies evident in Table C-2 are unremark-
able. Some clues as to the appropriate interpretation of these results may
be provided by a further examination of the collected data.
D. Which Parties Are Successful in Offering Neutral Explanations?
Table D-1 sets forth the numbers and success rates of the four catego-
ries of Batson complainants in those cases in which courts have passed upon
the adequacy of the neutral explanations proffered by the Batson
respondents.
TABLE D-1
PROVIDING NEUTRAL EXPLANATIONS BY PARTIES
Successful Unsuccessful Success Rate
Prosecutors 647 165 79.93%
Criminal Defendants 2 11 15.38%
Civil Defendants 15 11 57.69%
Civil Plaintiffs 2 4 33.33%
Total 676 191 77.97%
Notably, criminal defense lawyers have been disproportionately unsuc-
cessful at offering neutral explanations to rebut prima facie Batson claims.
This result, combined with the relatively small number of Batson claims
made by prosecutors, tends to confirm the hypothesis that prosecutors are
particularly selective about raising Batson challenges. By contrast, prosecu-
tors have enjoyed the highest success rate at rebutting prima facie Batson
complaints with neutral explanations. But when this result is combined
with the manifestly disproportionate number of Batson complaints made
against prosecutors, it tends to confirm the hypothesis that criminal de-
fense lawyers are relatively unselective about raising Batson challenges.
An additional conclusion suggested by the data is that it may not be as
easy as some critics have theorized 75 to proffer acceptable neutral explana-
tions in order to avoid a Batson violation. In 191 cases, 22% of all cases in
which a prima facie case was established, the Batson respondent failed to
provide satisfactory neutral explanations for the targeted peremptory
challenges.
75 See Serr & Maney supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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E. Which Groups Are Allegedly Disqualified by Illegal Peremptory Challenges?
Table E-1 details the numbers of cases for each group which was the






Native Americans 16 1.33%
Whites 15 1.25%











The data thus indicates that, during the survey period, almost all Bat-
son challenges were based upon claimed racial discrimination,.with the sub-
stantial majority of these allegations claiming discrimination against black
venirepersons.
Table E-2 breaks down, for each targeted group, the number of cases
in which a final resolution of the Batson claim was reached and examines
the success rate of Batson claims on behalf of each such group.
Interestingly, Batson challenges based upon claimed discrimination
against the two numerically significant groups-blacks and Hispanics-
produced similar low rate of success. By comparison, Batson challenges
based upon claimed discrimination against some other targeted groups,
although numerically small, produced greater success rates.
These numbers can be further explored by examining the success
rates, detailed for each targeted group, in establishing a prima facie case.
Table E-3 does exactly that.
76 J. E. B. v. Alabama ex reL T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994), in which the Court authoritatively
extended Batson to gender-based peremptory challenges, was not decided until after the survey
period closed, which fact undoubtedly contributes to the relatively few Batson claims based upon
gender.
77 These cases were those in which the Batson complainant alleged that the Batson
respondent was exercising peremptory challenges so as to exclude some combination of
unspecified minority-group venirepersons.
78 The total in Table E-1 is greater than the total in Table A-1 because some Batson




PREVAILING COMPLAINTS BY TARGETED GRouPs
Successful Unsuccessful Success Rate
Blacks 169 828 16.95%
Hispanics 10 65 13.33%
Native Americans 0 14 0.00%
Whites 8 7 53.33%
Women 3 7 30.00%
Men 3 6 33.33%
Asians 0 5 0.00%
Italian-Americans 0 3 0.00%
Young 1 2 33.33%
Minorities 0 2 0.00%
Hawaiians 0 1 0.00%
Hearing-Impaired 1 0 100.00%
Jewish 0 1 0.00%
Religion 0 1 0.00%
Total 195 942 17.15%
TABLE E-3
ESTA BLISHING A PRIMA FAcIE CASE BY TARGETED GROUPS
Successful Unsuccessful Success Rate
Blacks 465 285 62.00%
Hispanics 43 22 66.15%
Native Americans 6 8 42.86%
Whites 11 2 84.62%
Women 6 5 54.55%
Men 5 4 55.56%
Asians 1 2 33.33%
Italian-Americans 2 1 66.67%
Young 1 1 50.00%
Minorities 0 0
Hawaiians 0 0
Hearing-Impaired 1 0 100.00%
Jewish 1 0 100.00%
Religion 0 1 0.00%
Total 542 331 62.08%
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Table E-4 compares the success rates in establishing a prima facie case
with the success rates in establishing a Batson violation, broken down by
targeted groups.
TABLE E-4
SUCCESS RATES BY TARGETED GROUPS













































PROVIDING NEUTRAL EXPLANATIONS BY TARGETED GROUPS
Success Rate of
Successful Unsuccessful Batson Respondents
Blacks 633 168 79.03%
Hispanics 44 10 81.48%
Native Americans 6 0 100.00%
Whites 5 8 38.46%
Women 2 3 40.00%
Men 3 3 50.00%
Asians 3 0 100.00%
Italian-Americans 3 0 100.00%
Young 1 1 50.00%
Minorities 2 0 100.00%
Hawaiians 1 0 100.00%
Hearing-Impaired 0 1 0.00%
Jewish 1 0 100.00%
Religion 0 0 -
Total 704 194 78.40%
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To the extent that the overall success of Batson complainants is signifi-
cantly lower than their success in establishing a prima facie case, the obvi-
ous conclusion is that Batson respondents are generally successful in
providing satisfactory neutral explanations when pressed to do so. Table
E-5 examines the success of Batson respondents in proffering acceptable
explanations for peremptorily challenging jurors in the specified targeted
groups.
The overall results show that, when called upon to do so, Batson re-
spondents offer acceptable neutral explanations in almost four out of five
situations. This, of course, tends to confirm the hypothesis that the odds
are not with the Batson complainant ultimately prevailing. On the other
hand, the success rates for Batson respondents offering explanations is not
so high as to suggest that the courts merely rubber stamp virtually all such
explanations as satisfactory.
The numbers involved for most of the individual targeted groups are
manifestly too small to justify any firm conclusions. However, it is noticea-
ble that Batson respondents are less successful in generating acceptable ex-
planations for peremptory challenges exercised on the basis of gender or
against whites, as compared with peremptory challenges exercised against
blacks or Hispanics. To a certain extent, this result is counterintuitive, be-
cause, unlike blacks and Hispanics, none of these groups-whites, women
or men-is likely to constitute a minority of the venire. Therefore peremp-
tory strikes used against members of these groups would presumably be less
remarkable and less suspicious. It may very well be that the relatively large
number of Batson claims involving peremptory challenges against blacks
and Hispanics, coupled with the comparatively high success rate of Batson
respondents in explaining peremptory challenges against members of
these groups, is to be explained in part by the absence of selectivity in rais-
ing Batson claims on behalf of these groups.
79
F. How Has Batson Been Applied in Dfferent Jurisdictions?
Table F-1 compares the success of Batson complainants in establishing
prima facie cases in federal courts as contrasted with state courts, with simi-
lar results.
79 If true, this hypothesis could only account for a deflation in the success rate of these claims
by the inclusion of some number of patently unmeritorious claims in the figures collected. It is
clear, however, that the most obvious explanation for the large number of Batson claims brought
on behalf of black and Hispanic jurors is that it is these venirepersons who are primarily victim-
ized by Batson violations. As Table E-2 demonstrates, 179 successful Batson claims have involved
peremptory strikes used against blacks or Hispanics. This total represents over 92% of the 195
successful Batson claims detailed in Table E-2.
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TABLE F-1
ESTABLISHING A PRIMA FACIE CASE BY COURTS
Successful Unsuccessful Success Rate
Federal 73 47 60.83%
State 446 268 62.46%
Table F-2 compares the success of Batson complainants ultimately in es-
tablishing a Batson violation in federal courts as contrasted with state courts,
with less similar results. Although the comparison is flawed because it neces-
sarily involves two entirely distinct sets of cases, Batson complainants in state
courts have a better track record than do their federal counterparts.
TABLE F-2
PREVAILING COMPLAINANTS BY COURTS
Successful Unsuccessful Success Rate
Federal 15 134 10.07%
State 176 761 18.78%
Table F-3 examines the success rates of Batson complainants in establish-
ing prima facie cases for each state and federal circuit.80
A number of conclusions is available from the information contained in
Table F-3. First, the number of reported decisions in which the prima facie
case issue has been resolved varies widely from one jurisdiction to another.
To some extent, this results from a pattern by some jurisdictions to either
ignore the prima facie case threshold or to merge it with the Batson respon-
dent's explanations into a single criterion. However, as will be made clearer
by the next table, there simply is a great disparity among jurisdictions as to
the prevalence of Batson claims, even taking into account differences in popu-
lations and corresponding caseloads. In some jurisdictions, Batson appears to
have had little impact upon the jury selection process, while in others it has
generated a significant amount of motion practice.
Second, it is clear that the prima facie case threshold carries different
meanings in different places.81 In some states, such as Alabama, California,
Florida, New York and Texas, the prima facia case showing is a minor obsta-
cle to shifting to the Batson respondent the burden to come forward with
neutral explanations. In some other states, such as Louisiana, the prima facie
case requirement is often an insurmountable hurdle to the Batson
complainant.
82
Table F-4 examines the ultimate success or failure of Batson claims, again
on a jurisdiction by jurisdiction basis.
80 Federal district courts have been included within their respective circuits.
81 Rodger L. Hochman, Abolishing the Peremptory Challenge: The Verdict of Emerging Caselaw, 17
NovA L. REv. 1367, 1381-83 (1993).
82 As will be explored later, different courts use different tests for determining whether a




ESTABLISHING A PRIMA FACIE CASE BY JURISDICTIONS
Successful Unsuccessful Success Rate
Alabama 60 32 65.22%
Alaska 0 0 -
Arizona 8 1 88.89%
Arkansas 5 8 38.46%
California 17 7 70.83%
Colorado 1 2 33.33%
Connecticut 2 4 33.33%
Delaware 0 0 -
District of Columbia 1 3 25.00%
Florida 21 2 91.30%
Georgia 29 22 56.86%
Hawaii 1 0 100.00%
Idaho 1 0 100.00%
Illinois 49 34 59.04%
Indiana 5 8 38.46%
Iowa 0 1 0.00%
Kansas 4 1 80.00%
Kentucky 1 2 33.33%
Louisiana 16 33 32.65%
Maine 0 0 -
Maryland 10 2 83.33%
Massachusetts 4 1 80.00%
Michigan 0 1 0.00%
Minnesota 2 1 66.67%
Mississippi 8 1 88.89%
Missouri 23 35 39.66%
Montana 0 0 -
Nebraska 6 1 85.71%
Nevada 2 1 66.67%
New Hampshire 0 0 -
New Jersey 3 75.00%
New Mexico 4 2 66.67%
New York 35 12 74.47%
North Carolina 6 12 33.33%
North Dakota 0 0 -
Ohio 0 1 0.00%
Oklahoma 4 1 80.00%
Oregon 1 0 100.00%
Pennsylvania 9 7 56.25%
Rhode Island 1 1 50.00%
South Carolina 10 2 83.33%
South Dakota 1 1 50.00%
Tennessee 0 6 0.00%
Texas 81 15 84.38%
Utah 2 1 66.67%
Vermont 0 0
Virginia 7 1 87.50%
Washington 1 1 50.00%
West Virginia 3 0 100.00%
Wisconsin 0 0
Wyoming 1 3 25.00%
First Circuit 0 2 0.00%
Second Circuit 10 1 90.91%
Third Circuit 3 1 75.00%
Fourth Circuit 8 4 66.67%
Fifth Circuit 12 5 70.59%
Sixth Circuit 2 5 '28.57%
Seventh Circuit 8 2 80.00%
Eighth Circuit 15 15 50.00%
Ninth Circuit 6 2 75.00%
Tenth Circuit 2 4 33.33%
Eleventh Circuit 7 6 53.85%
D.C. Circuit 0 0 -
U.S. Supreme Court 0 0 -
Total 519 315 62.23%
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TABLE F-4































New Hampshire 0 0
New Jersey 2 2
New Mexico 1 4
New York 16 25
North Carolina 0 24





Rhode Island 0 4
South Carolina 8 13







West Virginia 1 1
Wisconsin 1 2
Wyoming 0 1
First Circuit 0 2
Second Circuit 1 8
Third Circuit 2 5
Fourth Circuit 1 13
Fifth Circuit 1 24
Sixth Circuit 0 9
Seventh Circuit 2 13
Eighth Circuit 1 35
Ninth Circuit 4 7
Tenth Circuit 1 5
Eleventh Circuit 2 12
D.C. Circuit 0 0
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Once again, several conclusions are apparent from this information.
First, Table F-4 confirms that Batson is often invoked in some jurisdictions
and largely ignored in others. Second, a very high percentage of successful
Batson claims is concentrated in a few jurisdictions. Of the 191 successful
claims, 111 (or 58.7%) of these claims come from just five states: Alabama,
Florida, Illinois, New York and Texas. Third, in very few states does a sig-
nificant percentage of Batson complainants ultimately succeed, and only a
very few of these are states in which a significant number of Batson claims
have been entertained. Fourth, the ultimate success rates described in Ta-
ble F-4 indicate a significant dropoff from the success rates in establishing a
prima facie case in Table F-3. A specific, jurisdiction by jurisdiction com-
parison of these percentages is detailed in Table F-5.
One of the criticisms of the Batson process is that it is too easy for the
Batson complainant to meet the prima facie case threshold and too easy for
the Batson respondent to avoid detection by offering pretextual explana-
tions which are routinely accepted by the courts. 3 This hypothesis cannot
be confirmed by looking at the overall success rates for both the establish-
ment of prima facie cases and the proffering of neutral explanations. How-
ever, when the data is isolated for individual jurisdictions, a much stronger
case can be made for this hypothesis as to certain jurisdictions. Table F-5
reveals several jurisdictions in which the decline from the success rate in
establishing a prima facie case to the success rate in ultimately prevailing
on a Batson claim has indeed been very steep. And in some of these juris-
dictions, the number of cases examined has been large enough to at least
raise some questions about the systemic handling of Batson claims in cer-
tain jurisdictions. Of course, the cases considered in each jurisdiction pres-
ent unique issues to the respective court systems.
Nevertheless, one has to wonder why, for example, in cases in which
the Texas courts resolved the prima facie case issue, eighty-one of the
ninety-six Batson complainants succeeded, while, in cases in which the Loui-
siana courts resolved the same issue, only sixteen of the forty-nine com-
plainants succeeded. And one has to wonder why, for example, over 68%
of the Batson complainants ultimately prevailed in Florida while only two of
sixty-eight Batson complainants ultimately prevailed in Louisiana and only
one of thirty-six ultimately prevailed in the Eighth Circuit. At the very least,
the data suggests that the criteria used by the courts in measuring both the
existence of a prima facie case and the adequacy of proffered explanations
is by no means uniform.
G. How Do Courts Determine the Existence of a Prima Facie Case?
Batson itself gave no specific direction as to the measure of a prima
facie case.
In deciding whether the defendant has made the requisite showing, the
trial court should consider all relevant circumstances. For example, a
"pattern" of strikes against black jurors included in the particular venire
might give rise to an inference of discrimination. Similarly, the prosecu-
83 See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
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tor's questions and statements during voir dire examination and in exer-
cising his challenges may support or refute an inference of discriminatory
purpose. These examples are merely illustrative. We have confidence
that trial judges, experienced in supervising voir dire, will be able to de-
cide if the circumstances concerning the prosecutor's use of peremptory
challenges creates -a prima facie case of discrimination against black
jurors.8 4 ,
Although some commentators have cautioned against relying solely upon a
mathematical formula for determining the prima facie case issue,8 5 it is
hardly surprising that Batson respondents only infrequently demonstrate
discriminatory intent by their questions and statements during jury selec-
tion. Consequently, in most cases, the task for the court is to determine
what constitutes a "pattern" of strikes against the targeted group, which
quite naturally leads to the creation of mathematical formulae.
An examination of the decisions within the survey period reveals eight
such methods of quantifying the results of the peremptory challenges used
by the Batson respondent. Table G-1 simply explains these various
formulae.
TABLE C-1





This method simply examines the jury as finally selected. If thejury
as impaneled includes a sufficient number of jurors from the
targeted group, the court finds that no prima facie case has been
established, without regard to the peremptory challenges used by
the Batson respondent.
This method compares the, percentage of the members of the
targeted group on the jury as impaneled with the percentage of the
members of the targeted group in the venire from which the
particular jury was selected., Thus, for example,,if blacks constitute
only about 8% of the venire and one black is seated on a jury of
twelve persons (8.33%), then no prima facie case has been
established, without regard to the peremptory challenges used by
the Batson respondent.
This method compares the percentage of the members of the
targeted group on the jury as impaneled with the percentage of the
members of the targeted group in the county or district from which
the venire has been selected. Method C is identical to Method B
except that it uses the general population as a basis of comparison
instead of the venire. It is used infrequently and generally only in
cases in which information about the makeup of the venire has
become unavailable. Like Method B, if the percentage of targeted-
group members on the jury is not significantly lower than the
comparison group, then no prima facie case h.s been established,
84 Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97.
85 See, e.g., Alan B. Rich, PeremptoyJuy Strikes in Texas after Batson and Edmondson, 23 ST.
MAR's lJ. 1055, 1065 n.55 (1992); Serr & Maney, supra note 73, at 28, 30 n.170, 35-36.
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without regard to the peremptory challenges used by the Batson
respondent.
This method simply tallies the number of peremptory challenges
used by the Batson respondent against members of the targeted
group. Under this method, there is apparently some number of
such strikes which will prompt the court to conclude that a prima
facie case has been made.
This method simply computes the percentage of the peremptory
challenges used by the Batson respondent which were exercised
against members of the targeted group. Like Method D, under this
method there is apparently a percentage of such strikes that will
cause the court to conclude that a prima facie case has been
established.
This method looks to see if the Batson respondent has removed all
of the members of the targeted group who were in the venire or
who were in the venire in a position such that they could have been
selected for the jury. In most situations in which this phenomenon
occurs, the court will find that a prima facie case has been
established. Occasionally, in cases in which the Batson complainant
has only this fact to present in support of the prima facie case and
the number of persons from the targeted group who have been
peremptorily removed is very small, the courts will conclude that no
prima facie case has been established.
This method calculates the percentage of members of the targeted
group on the venire who have been removed by the peremptory
challenges of the Batson respondent. Like Method E, under this
method there is apparently a percentage of such strikes which is
sufficiently high to constitute a prima facie case.
This method compares the percentage of the Batson respondent's
peremptory challenges used against targeted-group members with
the percentage of targeted-group members in the venire. Thus, for
example, if members of a targeted group constitute 20% of the
venire, but the Batson respondent uses 80% of his or her peremptory
challenges against members of that targeted group, then a prima
facie case has likely been established. The theory underlying this
method is that, if targeted-group membership is irrelevant to the
Batson respondent's use of peremptory challenges, then the portion
of the Batson respondent's peremptory strikes used against the
targeted-group members ought to roughly parallel the portion of
the venire which consists of members of that targeted group.
Characterizing these various formulae as "methods" requires a bit of a
disclaimer, for it is actually rare that a court decision first endorses one of
the above methods and then applies it to particular facts before it. Invaria-
bly, courts resolving Batson disputes will simply point to a total or ratio,
fairly described as fitting within one of the above methods, as the reason
for its conclusion that a prima facie case has or has not been established.
Thus, it is by no means obvious that the selection of a method dictates the
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result, rather than a method functioning as an explanation for a result
reached for indeterminate reasons.
Table G-2 tabulates the number of times each of these methods has
been used as the basis for a resolution of the prima facie case issue. Ex-
cluded from Table G-2 are cases in which the prima facie case ruling
turned in whole or in part on factors other than one of the above methods.
Also excluded from Table G-2 are cases in which the courts relied on some
combination of these methods. Thus, Table G-2 reports only decisions in
which the prima facie case question was resolved exclusively or predomi-
nately on the basis of a single method specified in Table C-1.
TABLE G-2












The number of cases in which the courts have used one of these meth-
ods in determining, or at'least explaining, the prima facie case determina-
tion is quite significant. The total cases figure of 585 in Table G-2 should
be compared with the total cases figure of 834 in Table C-1. The latter
figure represents the total number of cases surveyed in which a determina-
tion was made on the prima facie case issue: 585, or 70.14%, of these deci-
sions are definitively linked to one of the methods detailed in Table G-1.
It is also quite clear that the method a court chooses to determine or
explain its prima facie case determination is significantly correlated to the
result of that inquiry. Table G-3 presents the success rates of Batson com-
plainants on the prima facie case issue based upon the method used by the
court rendering the decision.
A number of interesting conclusions is available from the tabulations
thus far presented. For example, one might intuitively think that the use of
a formula to determine the prima facie case question would benefit Batson
respondents rather than Batson complainants because it might lead courts
to pay insufficient attention to nonquantifiable indicia of discriminatory
intent.8 6 In that respect, one might expect that the cases in which such
mathematical tests are used would disproportionately include cases in
which a prima facie case was not found to have been established. But in
fact, the data reveals precisely the opposite result.
86 Cf. Serr & Maney, supra note 73, at 35-36.
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TABLE G-3
SUCCESS RATES BASED UPON PRIMA FACIE CASE METHODS
Successful Unsuccessful Success Rate
METHOD A 5 31 13.89%
METHOD B 3 30 9.09%
METHOD C 0 2 0.00%
METHOD D 61 19 76.25%
METHOD E 98 20 83.05%
METHOD F 162 15 91.53%
METHOD G 71 34 67.62%
METHOD H 26 8 76.47%
Total 426 159 72.82%
For example, Table G-3 indicates that cases in which the specified
methods were used produced a prima facie case success rate of 72.82%,
markedly higher than the 62.23% prima facie case success rate for all cases
detailed in Table C-1. Table C-1 also indicates a total of 519 cases in which
a prima facie case was established. Table G-3 reveals that, in 426 cases
(82.08% of the total 519 cases), a method was used to establish the prima
facie case. By contrast, Table C-1 indicates a total of 315 cases in which a
prima facie case was specifically found not to have been established. Table
G-3 reveals that, in only 159 cases (50.48% of the total 315 cases) was a
method used in concluding that no prima facie case had been established.
A correlation thus exists between the use of one of the specified methods
and the establishment of a prima facie case. However, any conclusion as to
causation would be extremely speculative for the reasons discussed earlier.
It is, in fact, entirely possible that the courts tend to explain their conclu-
sions in methodological terms primarily in those cases in which the num-
bers speak for themselves in establishing a prima facie case.
Firmer ground can be found by focusing on the choice of methods
used by the courts in resolving the prima facie case issue. Here, many of
the courts attempting to implement Batson have simply bungled the task of
defining a "pattern" of unlawful strikes. Method A, which focuses exclu-
sively on the makeup of the resulting jury, is flawed in three respects. First,
this method necessarily is predicated on the erroneous assumption that the
purpose of Batson and its progeny is to protect litigants, notjurors. Given
this predicate flaw, as long as a litigant who is a member of a targeted
group secures a sufficient number of targeted-group members on the jury,
there is no reason for concern. But, as explained earlier, the Batson line of
cases can only be understood as primarily protecting the rights ofjurors.
8 7
87 See supra notes 41-64 and accompanying text. This misfocus on the actual makeup of the
jury does not always benefit the Batson respondent. For example, in State v. Sholl, 743 P.2d 406
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1987), a prima facie case was found despite the fact that the Batson respondent
used no peremptory challenges against any members of the targeted group. However, because
the Batson respondent had not used all available peremptory challenges, the sole targeted group
member in the venire was not reached. The Arizona courts found this to be a prima facie case,




From the perspective of the improperly excluded juror, the inclusion of a
different member of the same targeted group is hardly sufficient
mitigation.
Second, even from the perspective of the litigant, all members of the
same targeted group are plainly not fungible. The exclusion, for impermis-
sible reasons, of a juror favored by the Batson complainant is surely not
cured by the inclusion of another juror sharing perhaps no more than a
single cosmetic characteristic with the dismissed juror.
And finally, Method A fails because it does not even begin to address
the question presented. How many members of the targeted group must
be on the jury to satisfy this test? If, for example, three out of twelve is
enough, does it matter that it would have been nine out of twelve but for
the Batson respondent's peremptory strikes?
It is not surprising that the success rate for Batson complainants is so
comparatively low when Method A is used, for Method A is not so much a
method as an excuse. Courts that use Method A, even in cases in which the
court concludes that a prima facie case has been established, are forsaking
their obligation to protect each individual prospective juror from illegal
discrimination. In addition, courts that use Method A effectively insulate
Batson respondents from the scrutiny which would result from the applica-
tion of a more sensible method of resolving the prima facie case issue.
Method B, which compares the percentage of the targeted group on
the jury with the percentage of the targeted group in the venire, essentially
suffers from all the flaws of Method A. By ignoring the Batson respondent's
peremptory challenges and the characteristics of the peremptorily chal-
lenged venirepersons, this method fails to address the primary purpose of
the Batson rule-the protection of individual jurors. Moreover, the Batson
respondent's use of peremptory challenges is only one factor in determin-
ing the ultimate composition of the jury. As such, this method enables
Batson respondents fortuitously to escape scrutiny. For example, in one
case,88 no prima facie case was found because there were six of twelve
(50.00%) targeted-group members on thejury and seventeen of forty-seven
(36.17%) targeted-group members in the venire, even though eight of ten
(80.00%) of the Batson respondent's peremptory challenges were used
against targeted-group members. In a second example, 89 no prima facie
case was found because there were nine of twelve (75.00%) targeted-group
members on the jury and twenty-two of forty-two (52.38%) targeted-group
members in the venire, even though ten of ten (100.00%) of the Batson
respondent's peremptory challenges were used against targeted-group
members. In a third case,90 no prima facie case was found because there
were five of twelve (41.67%) targeted-group members on the jury and fif-
teen of forty-four (34.09%) targeted-group members in the venire, even
though ten of sixteen (62.50%) of the Batson respondent's peremptory
88 Willis v. State, 411 S.E.2d 714 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991), cert. denied, No. S92C0235, 1991 Ga.
LEXIS 1016 (Ga. Dec. 4, 1991), and cert. denied, No. S92C0815, 1992 Ga. LEXIS 411 (Ga. May 8,
1992).
89 Shawv. State, 411 S.E.2d 534 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991).
90 Hood v. State, 598 So. 2d 1022 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991), cert. denied, No. 1911122, 1992 Ala.
LEXIS 801 (Ala. May 29, 1992).
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challenges were used against targeted-group members. And in a fourth
case,91 no prima facie case was found because there were six of twelve
(50.00%) targeted-group members on the jury and thirteen of twenty-eight
(46.43%) targeted-group members in the venire, even though seven of
eight (87.50%) of the Batson respondent's peremptory challenges were
used against targeted-group members.
Method C, which compares the percentage of the targeted group on
the jury with the percentage of the targeted group in the relevant county or
district, has been used minimally. It is essentially a duplicate of Method B
with an even less relevant point of reference. It suffers from all the theoret-
ical and practical defects of Method B, while adding another layer of im-
precision by assuming that a particular venire mirrors the demographics
and immutable characteristics of the local population generally.
Method D, which focuses upon the number of peremptory challenges
used by the Batson respondent against targeted-group members, suffers
from some fatal flaws as well. First, the raw number of peremptory chal-
lenges used against targeted-group members is meaningless without some
point of reference. Five such peremptory challenges might mean one
thing if the Batson respondent used five peremptory challenges, but it
might mean quite another thing if the Batson respondent used twenty per-
emptory challenges. And five peremptory challenges against targeted-
group members might be dispositive if only five such individuals had previ-
ously populated the venire, but they might be entirely unremarkable if vir-
tually the entire venire had consisted of people in that group. Indeed, the
almost total uselessness of the bare number of peremptory challenges used
against targeted-group members must cause one to wonder whether at least
some of the courts which offer this fact alone in support of the prima facie
case ruling have done a poor job of articulating the reference point which
gives the number some meaning.
Method D is also flawed because it does not complete its task; i.e., it
does not tell us how many such peremptory challenges constitute a prima
facie case. As a result, there is absolutely no consistency among the deci-
sions which point to this factor as being dispositive. For example, of the
sixty-one cases which found a prima facie case with this method, thirty-five
cases, (57.38% of the sixty-one cases) found a prima facie case based on the
striking of three or fewer targeted group members. On the other hand, of
the nineteen cases which found no prima facie case with this method, at
least six cases, (31.58% of the nineteen cases) found no prima facie case
even though four or more targeted-group members were stricken.
Method E, which focuses upon the percentage of the Batson respon-
dent's peremptory challenges used against targeted-group members, is su-
perior to Method D because it considers proportionality among the
peremptory challenges exercised. It is still flawed, however, because it
makes no provision for consideration of the proportion of the targeted
group in the venire. Using fifty percent of one's peremptory challenges
against members of a group constituting a small portion of the venire has
to be evaluated differently than exercising fifty percent of one's peremp-
91 Scott v. State, 599 So. 2d 1222 (Ala. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 599 So. 2d 1229 (Ala. 1992).
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tory challenges against members of a group constituting half or more of
the venire.
Like Method D, Method E does not prescribe the acceptable percent-
age to avoid a finding of a prima facie case. And like Method D, as a result,
Method E has produced inconsistent conclusions. Eleven of the cases
which found prima facie cases involved percentages of fifty percent or less,
while ten of the cases which found that a prima facie case had not been
made involved percentages of fifty percent or more.
Method F, which looks to see whether all members of the targeted
group (or all members of the targeted group who realistically might have
been selected for the jury) have been excluded, is not really a method so
much as, for many courts, an irrebuttable presumption. In other words,
this test seems to work in one direction only. For many courts, the removal
of all members of a targeted group, no matter how small the number
stricken, necessarily constitutes a prima facie case. On the other hand, no
court has explicitly or implicitly held that the striking of less than all of the
targeted group members necessarily precludes a finding that a prima-facie
case has been established. The few cases that have found the absence of a
prima facie case in this category have been cases in which the number of
targeted-group members peremptorily challenged has been very small, and
these courts have held that the fact that all of the available targeted-group
members have been challenged is not, by itself, enough to establish a
prima facie case. On the other hand, many of the 162 cases which have
found a prima facie case using this method have involved the striking of
only one or two targeted-group members.
This method shares the same theoretical flaw as some of the methods
discussed earlier; i.e., it misconstrues Batson's primary concern as the actual
makeup of the jury and the litigants' virtual entitlement to same-group par-
ticipation on the jury. It also has some very practical consequences as well.
Because of the misfocus and the rigidity of this method, it virtually insulates
the last targeted-group member in the venire from a peremptory chal-
lenge, unless the exerciser of that challenge is willing to endure the conse-
quences of a prima facie case finding.
Method G focuses upon the percentage of targeted-group members
removed by the Batson respondent's peremptory challenges. It is distin-
guishable from Method F because the percentage removed in cases in this
category is necessarily less than one hundred percent. This method is su-
perior to some of the other methods because it has a proportionality com-
ponent and it focuses upon the truly intended beneficiaries of Batson.
However, it is incomplete because it falls to take into account the portion
of targeted-group members in the venire. For example, removal of fifty
percent of the targeted-group membership in the venire by itself cannot be
truly, dispositive. In one case, the Batson respondent might have used ten
of ten peremptory challenges to remove ten of twenty targeted-group mem-
bers in a venire of sixty individuals. A prima facie case finding on these
facts would seem inevitable. In another case, the Batson respondent might
have used ten peremptory challenges, only one of which was used to chal-
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lenge one of two targeted-group members in a venire of sixty people. On
these facts, a prima facie case determination would be very much in doubt.
Like some of the methods discussed earlier, Method G suffers from its
failure to specify a definitive percentage for establishing a prima facie case.
And, like the other methods, it has suffered a varied application as a result.
Nine of the cases using this method to establish a prima facie case have
involved percentages of fifty percent or less. On the other hand, twenty-
four of the cases which have used this method in concluding that no prima
facie case has been established have involved percentages of fifty percent
or more.
Method H compares the percentage of the Batson respondent's per-
emptory challenges used against targeted-group members with the percent-
age of members of the targeted group in the venire. If you are still reading
at this point, then you know that this is where we have been heading all
along. Method H solves all the problems left unsolved, or even created, by
the other methods. It focuses upon the right people, the venirepersons. It
examines both the targeted-group members and the Batson respondent's
peremptory challenges in proportional, rather than absolute, terms. It is
perfectly sensible in that it recognizes that neutrally exercised peremptory
challenges ought, on average, to affect targeted-group members in propor-
tion to their membership on the venire as a whole.
And yet, this method has been articulated as the test for the prima
facie case determination in only thirty-four cases, which represents only
5.81% of the cases which have used some formula for resolving the prima
case issue, and only 4.08% of all the cases in which a decision has been
reached on the prima facie case question. It is also quite clear that consis-
tent application of Method H to the prima facie case inquiry would have
produced different results in many of the cases, usually more favorably to
the Batson complainant.
92
A better and more consistent application of the Batson prima facie case
inquiry would result if the courts would do two things. First, the courts
must recognize that the primary intended beneficiaries of the Batson rule,
particularly as it has developed since Batson itself, are the individual
venirepersons summoned for jury duty. Second, as a starting point in the
prima facie case analysis, courts should use the method described as
Method H above. Courts would still be free to roam in either direction on
the basis of nonquantifiable information presented on the prima facie case
question. But as a starting point in all cases, and as a dispositive point in
many cases in which the only evidence of a prima facie case is the quantifi-
able data which enters into the Method H formula, Method H is the clear
choice.
H. How Do Courts Determine the Adequacy of Neutral Explanations?
Within the 867 cases in which the courts have ruled on the sufficiency
of proffered neutral explanations, 93 a total of 2,994 peremptory challenges
92 For example, consider the cases discussed supra notes 88-91 and the accompanying text.
93 See supra Table D-1.
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have been the subject of such explanations. Of these, 533, (17.80%) have
been found to have been insufficientlyjustified. 94 An .examination of these
533 improperly challenged jurors reveals various rationales offered by the
courts for rejecting the proffered explanations of the Batson respondents.
Table H-1 lists these rationales and indicates, numerically and proportion-
ally; how often each rationale is cited by a court as grounds for rejecting a
proffered neutral explanation.
TABLE H-1
RATIONALES FOR REECTING PROFFERED NEUTRAL EXPLANATIONS
Number Percentage
Disparate Treatment 172 27.22%
Insufficient Voir Dire 102 16.14%
No Explanation Offered 79 12.50%
Unsupported by Record 61 9.65%
Unpersuasive 57 9.02%
Admission 55 8.70%
Other Stereotypes 49 7.75%
Absence of Common Trait 22 3.48%
Surrogate for Targeted Group 16 2.53%
Conclusory 10 1.58%
Good Jurors 9 1.42%
Total 63295 100.00%
The rather cryptic rationales listed in Table H-1 each require some
explanation.
Disparate Treatment. This is by far the most prevalent rationale for re-
jecting proffered neutral explanations. It examines the venirepersons ac-
cepted by the Batson respondents for characteristics proffered as reasons
for striking targeted-group members. Thus, for example, if the Batson re-
spondent has explained that six black venirepersons were peremptorily
challenged because they were each under twenty-five years of age, but four
94 When examined on ajuror by juror basis, Batson respondents offering neutral explana-
tions thus have a success rate of 82.20%. This compares with a success rate of 77.97% when
examined on a case by case basis. See supra Table 1)-i. It also compares with a success rate of
78.40% when examined on a targeted group per case basis. See supra Table E-5. It is perhaps
surprising that these figures are so similar, given the much larger total ofjurors than cases and
the fact that only one peremptory challenge has to be inadequately explained to result in a case
in which the explanations are found to be inadequate. Perhaps this can be accounted for by the
way many courts go about addressing the adequacy of proffered explanations. Although there
are some cases in which the courts, within a single case, segregate the acceptable explanations
from the improper explanations, frequently it is an "all or nothing" affair. In other words, in
many cases in which the courts specifically find less than all of the proffered explanations to be
unacceptable, they either neglect to address the other explanations or determine that the other
explanations are also inadequate because they are tainted by the determination that the Batson
respondent has acted with discriminatory intent as to some of the peremptory challenges in the
same case.
95 The total of 632 rationales exceeds the total of 533 jurors for whom proffered neutral
explanations were found unacceptable because sometimes courts supplied more than one
rationale for rejecting the proffered explanations of the Batson respondent.
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white jurors under twenty-five years of age have been accepted by the Bat-
son respondent, this would constitute disparate treatment. In cases in
which the proffered explanations are rejected under this rationale, the
seemingly necessary implications are that the proffered explanations are
pretextual and that the Batson respondents have lied to the court in order
to conceal illegal peremptory challenges.
This method of scrutinizing proffered explanations makes a good deal
of sense, 96 with two caveats. First, it should not become the exclusive test
for the adequacy of proffered explanations; otherwise, many Batson viola-
tions can escape detection, either by chance or by the design of the Batson
violators. Second, when the Batson respondents proffer that a combination
of characteristics provoked the striking of targeted-group members, it is
neither fair nor persuasive to reject such explanations because the same
characteristics exist singly, and not in the same combination, among ac-
cepted jurors. Despite the sensibility of this rationale, there exist many
cases in which courts have accepted proffered neutral explanations despite
a record demonstrating, or at least suggesting, disparate treatment. This
disparate treatment of the "disparate treatment" rationale surely contrib-
utes to the inconsistent application of Batson in the lower courts.
Insufficient Voir Dire. In these situations, the Batson respondents have
highlighted characteristics of the challenged targeted-group members
which provide rational grounds for peremptory challenges only if some ad-
ditional facts are assumed to be true. These additional facts could have
been confirmed or dispelled had the Batson respondents inquired, or in-
quired sufficiently, during voir dire. The failure of the Batson respondents
to do so is sometimes fatal to the success of the proffered explanations,
although, again, many courts accept proffered explanations in circum-
stances in which application of this rationale could easily have produced
different results. In cases in which the courts have rejected proffered ex-
planations under this rationale, it is certainly a plausible, and sometimes
explicit, conclusion that the failure to pursue the matter during voir dire
evidences the Batson respondent's bad faith and warrants a conclusion that
the proffered explanations are pretextual.
No Explanation Offered. In these cases, the Batson respondents have
been either unable or unwilling to proffer neutral reasons for the suspect
peremptory challenges. Included within this rationale are situations in
which the Batson respondents have simply denied an improper motive,
claimed to have had insufficient information on the challenged venireper-
sons, maintained only that other prospective jurors were better,97 or as-
serted that their clients, for unspecified reasons, wished the venirepersons
struck. In many of these cases, the Batson respondents have not been re-
quired to offer neutral explanations until long after the jury selection pro-
cedures and could not remember the reasons for the peremptory
challenges. Thus, Batson claims sustained under these circumstances do
96 See Acker, supra note 74, at 201.
97 One of the difficulties with this explanation is that it does not address why the targeted-
group member, as opposed to some other venireperson, was selected for a peremptory challenge
in order to reach the "better" juror.
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not necessarily imply bad faith or pretext on the part of the Batson respon-
dents. By contrast, consistent with thev continuing theme of inconsistency
in the workings of Batson, some courts accept as valid explanations reasons
such as insufficient information or a desire to reach another juror.
Unsupported by the Record. In these situations, the record of the voir dire
either fails to substantiate, or sometimes even flatly contradicts, the expla-
nations offered by the Batson respondents. Invariably, the courts need not,
and do not, resolve whether the Batson respondents' mischaracterizations
are intentional or inadvertent.
Unpersuasive. In these cases, the courts regard the proffered explana-
tions as so ludicrous or implausible that they conclude that the explana-,
tions are pretextual. One might suspect that this is a rationale of last resort
because it requires the courts to most directly find that the Batson respon-
dents have lied to the court.
98
Admission. In these cases, the Batson respondents have acknowledged
that the targeted-group status of the peremptorily stricken venirepersons
was at least relevant to the peremptory challenge decisions. This occurs
infrequently, but in these circumstances the courts universally conclude
that Batson has been violated.
Other Stereotypes. In these cases, the Batson respondents have offered, as
an alternative to the prima facie case inference, that peremptory challenges
have been exercised on the basis of the venirepersons' membership in a
targeted group, explanations that the venirepersons have been stricken be-
cause of their membership in other groups. In these few forty-nine circum-
stances, the courts have rejected these explanations because the
explanations are themselves based upon group stereotypes and not individ-
ual considerations. Table H-2 specifies the particular group stereotypes
which have been found to be inadequate rebuttals to prima facie Batson
cases.
The cases relying on this rationale are most peculiar. First of all, as
will be seen later, the explanations which have been found to be inherently
inadequate in these cases are routinely accepted by many other courts in
many other cases. Secondly, this rationale is clearly not what the Supreme
Court has envisioned as the proper implementation of Batson.99 Thirdly,
the courts using this rationale have been anything but clear about the
scope of the rationale. Are these group stereotypes unlawful generally
under Batson, or are they only unlawful when offered to rebut a prima facie
case predicated upon race or gender? And fourthly, to the extent that the
problem is that the Batson respondents operated on the basis of group ste-
reotypes rather than individual characteristics, then what is left of the per-
emptory challenge? If indeed the Batson respondents had sufficient
reasons to strike the venirepersons without resort to group stereotypes,
would not challenges for cause invariably have been sustained?
98 Cf Broderick, supra note 5, at 421-22.
99 Cases within the survey period were all decided prior to the extension of Batson to women
inJ. E. B. v. Alabama ex reL T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994). See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying
text.
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Absence of Common Trait. In these cases, the courts have rejected the
proffered explanations because the peremptorily challenged venirepersons
have been diverse, sharing no common trait other than the impermissible
one: shared membership in the targeted group. While this rationale
might have some bearing on the prima facie case determination, it is truly
nonsensical as applied to an evaluation of the proffered neutral explana-
tions. It is neither logically or legally necessary that Batson respondents
have a single reason for exercising all of their peremptory challenges, and
therefore the diversity of the challenged venirepersons speaks not at all to
the genuineness and sufficiency of the proffered explanations.
Surrogate for Targeted Group. In these cases, the Batson respondents evi-
denced a certain naivet6, either in their own world views or in their percep-
tion of the gullibility of certain judges. Some explanations are so
manifestly surrogates for the targeted groups as to be plainly unacceptable.
Some real examples of instances in this category, all in cases in which the
targeted group was blacks, include membership in the NAACP, people who
looked like Baptists, and people likely to be offended by racist jokes con-
tained in the evidence.
100 InJ. E. B. v. Alabama exreL T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994), the Court made explicitly clear
that the Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit the use of peremptory challenges on the basis
of group discriminations that have received only "rational basis" scrutiny, id. at 1429, which would
surely include virtually all of the group stereotypes listed in Table H-2.
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Condusory. In these cases, the proffered explanations, such as "de-
meanor" and "gave me a bad feeling," have been rejected because they
were too vague and conclusory. Prior to Batson, these type of intuitive
strikes were an inherent aspect of peremptory challenges. 10' But peremp-
tory challenges based upon these subjective judgments are almost impossi-
ble to screen for pretext.102 Nevertheless, as will be seen, most courts do
accept such explanations in the absence of other evidence of pretext, and
the latter approach appears to be the one dictated by the Supreme
Court.
0 3
Good Jurors. In these cases, the courts have focused upon characteris-
tics of the stricken venirepersons other than the characteristics highlighted
in the Batson respondents' explanations, independently assessed the
stricken venirepersons as being favorable jurors for the Batson respondents
(independent of their targeted-group status), and concluded that the
venirepersons must have been challenged because of their targeted-group
status. Almost no courts are willing to engage in this analysis (at least not
overtly), presumably because it requires the courts to substitute their judg-
ments for those of the parties on the qualities that make a favorable juror
for those parties. It would further seem that this rationale would not meet
with the approval of the Supreme Court.
In the final analysis, the courts have struggled with evaluating prof-
fered neutral explanations, producing no more consistency-neither as to
methods nor as to results-than they have produced in the prima facie case
arena. And unlike the prima facie case inquiry, there does not even appear
to be an approach which would consistently satisfy the competing interests
at stake. The courts have searched in vain for a suitable middle ground
between the traditional unfettered quality of peremptory challenges and
the consistent scrutiny Batson seems to require to make it principled and
meaningful.' 0 4 Particularly with regard to the evaluation of proffered neu-
tral explanations, an inherent difficulty lies in requiring acceptable reasons
in circumstances in which, because the persons struck are not subject to
challenges for cause, there cannot be truly persuasive reasons for their
removal.' 05
A system which, like the current one created by Batson, seeks to accom-
modate both the inherent aspects of the peremptory challenge and the
scrutiny of anti-discrimination laws is one which seeks a middle ground
which either does not exist or is impossible to locate. For this reason, some
critics have suggested that the peremptory challenge must either be abol-
ished or returned to its pre-Batson status. 10 6 Indeed, from the very begin-
ning, Justice Marshall argued that the anti-discrimination goals espoused in
Batson could only be accomplished by eliminating the peremptory chal-
lenge.' 0 7 The impact of the data collected from the surveyed cases upon
the question of the future of the peremptory challenge occupies the bal-
ance of this article.
101 Saltzburg & Powers, supra note 4, at 341 n.21.
102 Serr & Maney, supra note 73, at 58-59.
103 See Purkett v. Elem, 115 S. Gt. 1769, 1771 (1995), discussed supra at note 36.
104 See Bray, supra note 47, at 555; Serr & Maney, supra note 73, at 63.
105 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 127 (1986) (Burger, C. J., dissenting).
106 Bray, supra note 47, at 555; see also Serr & Maney, supra note 73, at 63.
107 Batson, 476 U.S. at 102-08 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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III. THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE
The impact of Batson has simply resurrected a long-standing debate
about the merits and failings of the peremptory challenge. The peremp-
tory challenge still enjoys significant support, with many describing it as
essential to a system of impaneling impartialjuries. 10 8 It also has its equally
vociferous critics, who link the peremptory challenge to a host of systemic
ills and call for its abolition. 10 9
Some of the costs of the peremptory challenge are not disputed. Per-
emptory challenges require a commitment of time and judicial resources,
both in the exercising of such challenges and in the voir dire that occurs as
a means for discovering the targets of such challenges." 0 They also some-
times engender costly litigation."' And Batson proceedings, which are nec-
essary only as long as the peremptory challenge continues to survive, are
extremely expensive, time-consuming and, sometimes, even divisive.
12
Up until Batson, the peremptory challenge was not only a sacred cow
in some circles, but a secret one as well. Many trial lawyers might have
insisted that their use of peremptory challenges was based upon sound as-
sessments of both the challenged venirepersons and the desired composi-
tions of the juries selected, but the validity of these claims could only be
tested anecdotally because no reasons needed to be given for peremptory
challenges. One byproduct of Batson is that, for the first time, we have a
body of cases in which there is a record of the reasons for exercising per-
emptory challenges. Accordingly, we now arguably have a more suitable
data base for testing the value of peremptory challenges generally.
There are certainly some questions that might be raised as to the rep-
resentativeness of this data base. First, because all of the reasons in our
data base were given in response to a Batson challenge, they might not be
representative of peremptory challenges generally. The most obvious rea-
son for this would be if the data base included false explanations so as to
avoid the consequences of a Batson violation. But the explanations ana-
lyzed in this section include only those situations in which the courts ac-
cepted the proffered explanations as legitimate. Even if the data base is
nevertheless overinclusive because the courts do not adequately screen
pretextual explanations, that would simply mean that some of the included
explanations were pretextual; it would not follow that the remaining, non-
pretextual explanations are not representative of peremptory challenges
generally. Moreover, even if the data base includes pretextual explana-
tions, one might expect that the pretextual explanations offered by the
Batson respondents were selected precisely because they are the usual, legit-
imate reasons for exercising peremptory challenges.
A second, and better, reason for questioning the data base is that, be-
cause the bulk of Batson complaints are lodged by the criminal defense, our
108 See, e.g., Zalesne & Zalesne, supra note 57; Cressler, supra note 45, at 381; Saltzburg &
Powers, supra note 4, at 382.
109 See, e.g., Broderick, supra note 5, at 420-23; Bray, supra note 47.
110 Jere W. Morehead, When a Peremptory Chabenge Is No Longer Peremptory: Batson's Unfortunate
Failure to Eradicate Invidious Discrimination from Juy Selection, 43 DEPAUL L. REv. 625, 639 (1994);
Broderick, supra note 5, at 421.
111 Broderick, supra note 5, at 371.
112 Morehead, supra note 110, at 639; Bray, supra note 47, at 545-46, 554, 568.
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sample of proffered neutral explanations is disproportionately occupied by
the explanations of prosecutors. As a matter of fact, this is incontrovertibly
true. But whether this significantly limits the value of the data is doubtful.
It is important in this context to distinguish between the categories of rea-
sons for exercising peremptory challenges (such as age or occupation) and
the specific application of those categories by prosecutors (such as people
under age twenty-five or social workers). Although attorneys representing
clients or interests different than those represented by prosecutors might
well target different subgroups within such categories, there is no reason to
believe that the same categories or characteristics are not equally relevant
to the peremptory challenge decisions made by these lawyers.' 13 There is
also no reason to believe that the reasonableness of peremptory challenges
exercised by lawyers other than prosecutors is appreciably superior or in-
ferior to that of prosecutors.
An examination of all the accepted explanations offered by Batson re-
spondents reveals sixteen major categories of reasons lawyers exercise per-
emptory challenges. Table Ili-A lists these categories and specifies the
numerical and proportional frequency in which each has been advanced.
TABLE HI-A
CATEGORIES OF ACCEPTED PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
Number Percentage
Prior Involvement with Criminal Conduct or Litigation
Behavior During Voir Dire

































Each of these categories requires further examination. First, for each
category, there exist several subcategories which further explain the nature
113 In fact, although the number of Batson respondents who were criminal defendants or civil
litigants was small, there was no noticeable difference in the categories of explanations offered by
these respondents.
114 The 3,898 accepted reasons for exercising peremptory challenges should be contrasted
with a total of 2,461 peremptory challenges which were found to have been adequately explained
by the Batson respondents. The former number is significantly larger than the latter one because,
quite often, a Batson respondent offers more than one accepted explanation for the scrutinized
peremptory challenge.
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of the peremptory challenges exercised. Second, the objective here is to
examine whether the peremptory challenge is truly a necessary, or even
worthwhile, device. This inquiry requires a more detailed examination of
the peremptory challenges to discover, at the very least, whether a system
which allowed only challenges for cause could sufficiently accommodate
the legitimate concerns of litigants and their counsel as to the individuals
who will populate the juries which will resolve their litigated fates. One
might expect that this inquiry would require solely an examination of
whether the proffered explanations are in fact legitimate, and certainly
that difficult task must be undertaken.
But a preliminary stage of the inquiry requires the examination of
whether the peremptory challenges should have been unnecessary because
the grounds for the challenge, if factually accurate, should have resulted in
the dismissal of the venirepersons on challenges for cause. One might
expect that such instances will materialize only infrequently because the
context in which these reasons appear-i.e., as explanations for exercised
peremptory challenges-necessarily would suggest that challenges for
cause had either been previously unsuccessful or had not been made be-
cause there was no basis for a challenge for cause. Surprisingly, however,
many of the accepted peremptory challenges, assuming that the explana-
tions offered have been bona fide, quite clearly should have resulted in
sustained challenges for cause.
Both the critics and the defenders of the peremptory challenge agree
that challenges for cause are unrealistically narrow, both as defined and as
applied. 115 Not only are the grounds for challenges for cause limited, but,
even more importantly, a venireperson's representation that he or she can
lay even the most manifest prejudice aside will generally insulate the
venireperson from a challenge for cause. 16 A large part of the explanation
for this phenomenon is the peremptory challenge itself. Trial judges can
routinely avoid any real scrutiny of venirepersons and deny challenges for
cause, secure in the knowledge that the lawyer will remove the venireper-
son anyway with a peremptory strike.117 Trial judges thus rely upon the
peremptory challenge as a substitute for the meaningful examination of
challenges for cause, which in turn causes trial lawyers to rely so heavily
upon their peremptory challenges." 8 Clearly, any system ofjury selection
which would seek to function without the peremptory challenge would
115 E.g., Saltzburg & Powers, supra note 4, at 355; Frederick L. Brown et al., The Peremptory
Challenge as a Manipulative Device in Criminal Trials: Traditional Use or Abuse, 14 Nmw ENG. L. Ray.
192, 235 n.244; Kuhn, supra note 4, at 243.
116 See, e.g., Barbara Allen Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving "Its Wonderful Power", 27 STAN. L. REv.
545, 549-50; Kuhn, supra note 4, at 243.
117 In cases in which a criminal defendant's challenge for cause is wrongfully denied, with the
result that the defense is forced to remove that venireperson with a peremptory challenge and is
thereby effectively deprived of a peremptory challenge that would otherwise have been available
to use against another venireperson, no federal constitutional right of the defendant has been
violated, and the erroneous denial of the challenge for cause is effectively unreviewable. Ross v.
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88 (1988).
118 See Saltzburg & Powers, supra note 4, at 340.
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have to require the revitalization, and possibly the expansion, of the chal-
lenge for cause.11 9
Because the objective here is to isolate the peremptory challenges
which would not be successful in a system in which challenges could only
be made for cause, a more realistic and meaningful scrutiny of the prof-
fered explanations is appropriate. As will be seen, a significant portion of
the peremptory challenges which have materialized from the data would
likely have resulted in the jurors being stricken for cause in a system with-
out peremptory challenges. What will also be seen is that the remaining,
"true" peremptory challenges tend to meet one of two descriptions. Either
the peremptory challenge was based upon a subjective assessment of the
individual venireperson by the Batson respondent, or the strike was based
upon a stereotypical assessment of the venireperson because of that indi-
vidual's inclusion in some identifiable group. That said, we tarn now to a
more detailed analysis, of the sixteen categories of accepted peremptory
challenges.
TABLE II-B
PRIOR INVOLVEMENT WITH- CRIMINAL CONDUCT OR LITIGATION
Number Percentage
Prior Criminal Activity °20  271 38.88%
Close Friends or Relatives-Prior Criminal Activity12' 376 53.95%
Victim of Crime 28 4.02%
Never Been Victim of Crime 15 2.15%
Insufficiently Concerned about Relative Who Was Victim of
Crime 3 0.43%
Prior Civil Litigant 4 0.57%
Total 697 100.00%
To the extent that the bases for the peremptory challenges involved
facts beyond the subcategories described in Table III-B,' 22 those additional
facts have been separately accounted for in other appropriate subcatego-
ies. For our purposes, we are dealing here with cases in which the bases
for the challenges are nothing more than the venireperson's generic inclu-
sion in the above-described subcategories. The first question, then, is
whether the mere fact that someone, or their friend or relative, has been
involved in criminal activity, a victim (or not) of a crime or involved in civil
litigation is, or should be, grounds for exclusion for cause.
119 Hochman, supra note 81, at 1401-02; Broderick, supra note 5, at422; Bray, supra note 47, at
557-58.
120 This subcategory includes venirepersons who had been convicted of, arrested for, or even
just suspected of, engaging in criminal activities.
121 This subcategory includes venirepersons who had close friends or relatives who had been
convicted of, arrested for, or suspected of, engaging in prior criminal activity.
122 Examples of cases which involve more than the subcategories described in Table III-B
would be situations in which the venireperson's relative was a victim of the same crime which is
the subject of the instant prosecution or situations in which the same individual prosecutor suc-
cessfully convicted the venireperson's relative.
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While a rational system ofjury selection could, particularly in criminal
cases, exclude some of these subgroups for cause, our systems generally
have not seen fit to do so. Whether this failure is because it would be un-
wise or unfair to do so, or because we have systemically relied upon the
peremptory challenge to take care of the "problem" is unknown. For our
purposes, we have to conclude that none of these reasons, standing alone,
would be the basis for a challenge for cause. It is also apparent that per-
emptory challenges based upon any of the grounds stated in Table III-B
involve group stereotypes rather than subjective individual evaluations.
TABLE I1-C
BEHAVIOR DURING VOIR DIRE
Number Percentage
Inattentive123
Wished to Avoid Jury Service' 24
Hostile Toward the Lawyer Who Later Exercised the
Challenge









Friendly Toward Opposing Party'
2 8
Answered No Voir Dire Questions
Assertive1
29





















Some of these subcategories could be satisfactorily addressed in a sys-
tem that allowed challenges only for cause. That is not to say that, in most
of these cases, challenges for cause would necessarily be granted. It is to
say, however, that because the objectionable conduct takes place in the
123 This subcategory includes venirepersons who were variously described as inattentive,
uninterested, nonresponsive, distracting or apathetic, and also includes individuals who fell
asleep or who arrived late for court.
124 This subcategory includes individuals who requested that they be excused, as well as
venirepersons who exhibited hostility toward the process or the obligation ofjury service.
125 This subcategory includes venirepersons variously described as timid, hesitant, shy,
indecisive, fearful, nervous, weak or anxious.
126 This subcategory includes venirepersons who were described as insufficiently attentive to
the Batson respondent or were described as making poor eye contact with the Batson respondent.
127 This subcategory includes venirepersons who were described as having engaged in strange,
bizarre, silly or frivolous behavior.
128 This subcategory includes venirepersons who were described as smiling at, seeking to
make eye contact with, or casting sympathetic glances toward, the opposing party.
129 This subcategory includes venirepersons who were variously described as assertive,
aggressive or strong-willed or as leaders.
[Vol. 71:3
BATSON IN PRACTICE
courtroom and within the perceptions of the trial judge, the court would
be in a position to assess the legitimacy of the accusation. If counsel were
concerned about the behavior escaping the attention of the court, counsel
could call the particular venireperson to the court's attention in a sidebar
conference. Specifically, the subcategories labeled "Inattentive," "Wished
to Avoid Jury Service," "Hostile Toward the Lawyer Who Later Exercised
the Challenge," "Responsive to Opposing Lawyer or What Opposing Law-
yer Said," "Inattentive To Lawyer Who Later Exercised Challenge,"
"Strange," "Friendly Toward Opposing Party" and "Gave Vague or Evasive
Responses" could be accommodated without peremptory challenges. The
trial judge could determine if the venireperson's behavior was so exces-
sively inattentive, hostile, bizarre, partial or evasive that their inclusion on
the jury would not provide all parties with a fair and impartial factfinder.
By contrast, objections to venirepersons on the grounds that they are
"timid," create an "unfavorable impression," "answered no voir dire ques-
tions," are "assertive," are "liberal or lenient," are "eager to serve" or are
"emotional" would probably find no comfort in a system requiring chal-
lenges to be for cause. The subcategory "Answered No Voir Dire Ques-
tions" appears to be based on a stereotype about such people, at least
relative to persons about whom mote information was obtained during voir
dire. The other six subcategories listed in this paragraph each manifest
subjective judgments by the lawyer seeking the removal of the described
persons.
TABLE III-D
POSSESSION OF ExTRAjumcICI INFORMATION OR BIAS
Number Percentage
Prior Familiarity with Parties, Witnesses or Lawyers 356 71.77%
Admitted Bias 60 12.10%
Prior Information about Case 35 7.06%
Expressed Predisposition on the Credibility of Witnesses'30  19 3.83%
Personal Experience Very Similar to Subject of Litigation 17 3.43%
Expertise in Relevant Field 7 1.41%
Bias Established from Information Obtained Outside Voir
Dire 2 0.40%
Total 496 100.00%
To the extent that descriptions contained in the subcategories listed in
Table III-D are accurate, any sensible system would remove such persons
for cause. That 496 persons survived challenges for cause, even allowing
for the possibility that the Batson respondents have exaggerated their dis-
qualifications, is compelling evidence that, under our current system, the
peremptory challenge is the safety net that makes challenges for cause a
less effective screening mechanism.
130 This subcategory refers to situations in which venirepersons commented generically about
the credibility of certain relevant categories of wimesses, such as police officers or rape victims.
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Expressed View Contrary to Applicable Law 288 74.42%
Lied or Failed to Disclose Information Called for on the Jury
Questionnaire or During Voir Dire 69 17.83%
Failed to Complete Form 25 6.46%
Disregarded Court's Instructions 5 1.29%
Total 387 100.00%
Certainly, each of the subcategories listed in Table III-E could be capa-
bly handled by a well-functioning system of challenges for cause. Voir dire
could reveal whether there was some innocent explanation for incidents
described in each of the last three subcategories, and it could also explore
whether views meeting the definition of the first subcategory were genu-
inely held and accurately expressed. Especially in a system without per-
emptory challenges, persons otherwise fitting within any of these





Old13 1  31 9.04%
Same Age as Opposing Party 56 16.33%
Children Same Age as Opposing Party 26 7.58%
Same Age as Parents of Opposing Party 5 1.46%
Total 343 100.00%
An attorney exercising peremptory challenges on all of the grounds
listed in Table III-F would be hard-pressed to find any acceptable
venirepersons. Correspondingly, a system which recognized these age fac-
tors as grounds for removal for cause would have trouble impaneling any
juries. Manifestly, these age-related criteria have no place in a system
which allows challenges only for cause. Also quite clearly, as grounds for
peremptory challenges, each of these subcategories is premised upon ste-
reotypes involving an assumed affinity based upon age.
131 To the extent that a person, incidental to being old, lacked the capacity to serve as ajuror,







Occupation 3 2  214 73.54%
Occupation of Friend or Relative' 3 3  50 17.18%
Area of Education or Training'34  17 5.84%
Spanish-Speaking' 3 5  9 3.09%
No Military Service 1 0.34%
Total 291 100.00%
132 Specifically, this subcategory consisted of thirty-one teachers, twenty-four social workers,
twenty-two blue collar workers, fourteen members of the clergy, twelve health care workers, ten
counselors, nine mental health care workers, nine postal workers, eight government employees,
seven corrections officers, seven law office employees, six students, five homemakers, five
venirepersons with unspecified jobs carrying little responsibility, five venirepersons with
unspecifiedjobs which would cause them to be sympathetic to the opposing party, four lawyers,
four security guards, three civilian employees of the police department, three people with the
same job as the opposing party, two librarians, two musicians, two professionals, two volunteers,
and one each of accountants, artists, church organists, day care workers, detectives, engineers,
hairdressers, janitors, journalists, massage therapists, military police, pharmacists, pipeline
operators, Playboy Club employees, "salesgirls," salesmen, theater employees and an employee
who worked for a television station that, independent of the venireperson, once broadcast a
documentary that was not complimentary to the police.
Only occasionally did the Batson respondents (predominantly prosecutors) explain their
theories as to the undesirability of the people with these occupations. When they did so,
however, they revealed that these peremptory challenges were premised upon such stereotypes
as: people in jobs that involve caring for other people are too liberal and too lenient; accountants
and engineers are too meticulous; people in the arts use drugs; people in law enforcement other
than the police are jealous and critical of the police; librarians, church organists and salesmen
are too liberal; government employees make bad jurors;journalists just want to get on a jury to
get a story; and postal workers are, apparently depending upon which lawyer you talk to, liberal,
tolerant of violence or dishonest. In none of these instances was there any indication that the
lawyers' inferences from the venirepersons' occupations were in any way corroborated during the
voir dire.
133 This subcategory includes venirepersons who had friends or relatives in certain
occupations, including eight lawyers, seven police officers, five members of the clergy, five
venirepersons who were divorced from police officers (or who had friends or relatives who were
divorced from police officers), four corrections officers, three social workers, three teachers, two
persons with unspecified jobs also held by the opposing party, two persons with unspecified jobs
which would provoke sympathy for the opposing party, two law office employees, two mental
health care workers, two postal workers, and one each of blue collar workers, civilian employees
of police departments, counselors, homemakers, and one spouse of a venireperson who worked
for a radio station that had, without any participation by the venireperson's spouse, once
broadcast a documentary that had not been complimentary to the police. In none of these cases
was there any indication that the voir dire specifically exposed any connection between the
occupation of the friend or relative and any relevant predisposition on the part of the friend or
relative. Further, in none of these cases was there any indication that the voir dire specifically
exposed any connection between any relevant predisposition on the part of the friend or relative
and any relevant predisposition on the part of the venireperson.
134 This subcategory includes nine venirepersons with some legal training and eight others
with some education or training in psychology, social work, sociology or theology.
135 This subcategory includes venirepersons who, by experience or education, were fluent in
Spanish. In each of these cases, the Batson respondent was concerned that these venirepersons
might not accept the official translations of the testimony of Spanish-speaking witnesses. In none
of these cases was there any reason advanced for this concern other than that the venirepersons
were fluent in Spanish.
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Without more than was offered by the Batson respondents in these in-
stances, none of these individuals would be subject to a challenge for cause.
In the case of each of the venireperons in this category, the peremptory





Short or Sporadic Employment History 37 15.88%
Low Income 8 3.43%
Family Member Unemployed 7 3.00%
Renter 7 3.00%
Welfare Recipient 2 0.86%
Financial Troubles 1 0.43%
Total 233 100.00%
None of the economic characteristics in Table III-H would justify re-






No Children 26 11.26%
Unmarried Parent 25 10.82%
Separated or Divorced 24 10.39%
Insufficient Community Ties 14 6.06%
Living with Parents 7 3.03%
Children 5 2.16%
Homosexual 2 0.87%
Living Unmarried with Significant Other 2 0.87%
Pregnant 2 0.87%
Relative on Jury 1 0.43%
Relative Removed by Peremptory Challenge 1 0.43%
Widow 1 0.43%
Total 231 100.00%
The subcategory "Relative Removed by Peremptory Challenge" would
be irrelevant in a system without peremptory challenges. The subcategory
"Relative on Jury" should arguably be the basis for a challenge for cause.
The balance of the subcategories in Table III-I are not proper grounds for






Insufficient Education 41 29.29%
Could Not Understand Voir Dire Questions 34 24.29%
Seemed Unintelligent 25 17.86%
Errors on Juror Form 16 11.43%
Could Not Understand Basic Legal Terms 13 9.29%
Will Not Understand Evidence, Issues or Law 6 4.29%
Illiterate 4 2.86%
Too Much Education 1 0.71%
Total 140 100.00%
The subcategories labeled "Insufficient Education," "Could Not Un-
derstand Voir Dire Questions," "Errors on juror Form," "Could Not Under-
stand Basic Legal Terms" and "Illiterate" could all be satisfactorily
addressed by challenges for cause. The trial judge is in a position to evalu-
ate the extent to which the factual predicate for the challenge indicates
some limitation in education or intelligence, the severity of the limitation
and the significance of the limitation in the context of the particular case.
For example, illiteracy may be disqualifying in a case in which much docu-
mentary evidence will be introduced, but it may be irrelevant in another
case in which all of the evidence will be presented in the form of oral
testimony.
The other three subcategories would not be proper grounds for chal-
lenges for cause. The subcategories labeled "Seemed Unintelligent" and
"Will Not Understand Evidence, Issues or Law," without more, are merely
subjective judgments of the lawyer. The subcategory entitled "Too Much
Education" is a group stereotype.
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TABLE III-K
LOCATION OF HOME, WORKPLACE OR OTHER ACTIVITIES
Number Percentage
Lived or Worked Near Home or Workplace of Party or
Witness or Near Location of Relevant Event 75 60.98%
Lived or Worked in High Crime Area 32 26.02%
Recently Relocated to Area 7 5.69%
From New York 2 1.63%
Same Address or Workplace as Juror Removed by
Peremptory Challenge 2 1.63%
Situated in Courtroom Near Opposing Party's "People" 2 1.63%
From Texas 1 0.81%
Inner City Person 1 0.81%
Not Certain Lived in Jurisdiction1 3 6  1 0.81%
Total 123 100.00%
In none of these situations did the voir dire reveal anything more spe-
cifically relevant to the grounds for removal than the descriptions con-
tained in Table III-K The subcategory labeled "Same Address or
Workplace as Juror Removed by Peremptory Challenge" is irrelevant in a
system without peremptory challenges. The last subcategory would be
grounds for a challenge for cause. With these exceptions, none of these
subcategories would be a basis for a challenge for cause. With the noted




Hardship13 7  75 67.57%
Difficulty Communicating 16 14.41%
Difficulty Hearing 11 9.91%
Language Difficulty 5 4.50%
Difficulty Seeing 2 1.80%
On Disability 2 1.80%
Total 111 100.00%
All of the concerns represented by the subcategories in Table III-L can
be accommodated by challenges for cause. The trial judge is in no worse
position than the lawyers to determine the relevance and severity of the
incapacity.
136 This subcategory consists of one person for whom (for reasons not disclosed) it was not
possible to determine whether the person lived in the jurisdiction and thus whether the person
was qualified to sit on a jury within that jurisdiction.
137 This subcategory includes venirepersons for whom jury service would be a physical or







Appearance or Demeanor I3 8  79 83.16%
Facial Hair 7 7.37%
Overweight 6 6.32%
Same Build as the Opposing Party 2 2.11%
Intoxicated 1 1.05%
Total 95 100.00%
Venirepersons who are intoxicated can and should be struck for cause.
Challenges for cause can also be used to address legitimate concerns about
appearance or demeanor. If a venireperson's appea-ance evidences disre-
spect for the court or the proceedings, removal for cause would not be
inappropriate. The trial judge is certainly in a position to segregate these
challenges from those based simply upon lawyers' preferences for well-
dressed (or poorly-dressed) jurors. The explanations labeled "Facial Hair,"
"Overweight" and "Same Build as Opposing Party" are each irrelevant to




Prior Jury Service 10 11.11%
No Prior Jury Service 7 7.78%
Unsatisfactory PriorJury Service' 3 9  73 81.11%
Total 90 100.00%
None of the subcategories in Table III-N would be a basis for a chal-
lenge for cause. Each is premised upon a group stereotype: that venireper-
sons are more or less favorable jurors if they have served before, or that
jurors' verdicts in unrelated cases are good predictors of their verdicts in
subsequent cases.
188 Although several challenges included in this subcategory were not further explained, most
of the explanations included here had to do with appearance, rather than behavior. Examples
include manner of dress, wearing sunglasses in the courtroom, chewing gum in the courtroom,
using a toothpick in the courtroom and wearing curlers.
139 This subcategory includes venirepersons who served on juries in prior cases which resulted
in hung juries or the "wrong" verdicts from the perspective of the Batson respondent, such as
cases in which the Batson respondent was a prosecutor and the prior jury acquitted the
defendant.
19961






Same Gender as Opposing Party 2 2.44%
Total 82 100.00%
Because challenges based upon gender are now illegal,a4° none of the
subcategories in Table III-0 is a proper basis for a challenge of any kind.
In that respect, a system without peremptory challenges is capable of




Religion 14 ' 18 69.23%
Did Not Own a Gun 2 7.69%
Member of Black Organization' 42  2 7.69%
Background in the Martial Arts 1 3.85%
Known to Be a Hard Drinker 1 3.85%
Read "Rolling Stone" Magazine 1 3.85%
Used Aliases 1 3.85%
Total 26 100.00%
In none of these instances was the explanation tied to the particular
issues in the case. In none of these instances did the Batson respondent
offer more than the bare information contained in Table III-P. The expla-
nations based upon membership in black organizations and religion are
almost surely illegal. The explanation involving the "hard drinker" might
presumably be a basis for a challenge for cause if the challenger could
support the conclusion that the venireperson could not be a reliable juror.
The remaining four subcategories are based upon group stereotypes and
would not support challenges for cause.
140 J. E. B. v. Alabama ex reL T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994).
141 This subcategory includes venirepersons who appeared to be very religious, were members
of exotic religious sects, or were members of religious groups whose tenets were viewed by the
Batson respondent as unfavorable in the context of the particular case. In none of these instances
is there any indication that the Batson respondent inquired particularly of the venireperson to
test the inference about the impact of the venireperson's religious beliefs upon that individual's
predispositions in the case at hand.
142 In one instance, the organization was the NAACP and in the other instance the




NEUTRAL EXPLANATION DID NOT INVOLVE ANY OBJECTION TO
THE CHALLENGED VENIREPERSON
Number Percentage
Insufficient Information 10 47.62%
Attempting to Reach BetterJuror 7 33.33%
Would Be Better in Upcoming Cases 3 14.29%
Batson Respondent Did Not Realize Venireperson Was in
Targeted Group 1 4.76%
Total 21 100.00%
None of these subcategories would be grounds for a challenge for
cause. "Insufficient Information" is a stereotype of sorts. "Attempting to
Reach a BetterJuror" and "Would Be Better in Upcoming Cases" could be
characterized as subjective evaluations, albeit of a relative, rather than an
absolute, nature. The last subcategory is not really an explanation at all
and would have been much more relevant to the prima facie case inquiry
than to the neutral explanations issue. Accordingly, it will be disregarded
in the final tabulations.
Our total of 3,897 explanations 143 has been thus analyzed to deter-
mine which explanations, in cases in which they are legitimate, could be
accommodated by challenges for cause. The remaining explanations have
been examined and found to consist of either group stereotypes or subjec-
tive judgments. The quantitative results of these examinations are con-




Addressable by Challenges for Cause 1,707 43.80%
Group Stereotypes 2,045 52.48%
Subjective Judgments 145 3.72%
Total 3,897 100.00%
The most obvious conclusion from Table III-R is that a sensible system
of challenges for cause would address nearly 44% of the concerns ex-
pressed in the explanations for the exercise of peremptory challenges. Of
course, this still leaves over 56% of venirepersons who would not be re-
moved but for peremptory challenges. The inquiry thus naturally turns to
whether these individuals can justifiably be excluded from jury service.
The vast majority of individuals who are removed by peremptory chal-
lenges and who would not be challengeable for cause are struck because of
group stereotyping. Table HI-S collects and tabulates all of the subcatego-
ries of explanations which have been characterized as group stereotypes.
143 We started with 3,898 explanations, see supra Table HI-A, and deleted one, see supra Table
I-Q and accompanying text.
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Close Friends or Relatives-Prior Criminal Activity 376 18.41%





Unsatisfactory Prior Jury Service 73 3.57%
Lived or Worked Near Home or Workplace of Party or Witness
or Near Location of Relevant Event 72 3.53%
Same Age as Opposing Party 56 2.74%
Occupation of Friend or Relative 50 2.45%
Short or Sporadic Employment History 37 1.81%
Lived or Worked in High Crime Area 32 1.57%
Old 31 1.52%
Victim of Crime 28 1.37%
Children Same Age as Opposing Party 26 1.27%
No Children 26 1.27%
Unmarried Parent 25 1.22%
Separated or Divorced 24 1.18%
Area of Education or Training 17 0.83%
Never Been Victim of Crime 15 0.73%
Insufficient Community Ties 14 0.69%
Answered No Voir Dire Questions 11 0.54%
Insufficient Information 10 0.49%
PriorJury Service 10 0.49%
Spanish-Speaking 9 0.44%
Low Income 8 0.39%
Facial Hair 7 0.34%
Family Member Unemployed 7 0.34%
Living with Parents 7 0.34%
No Prior Jury Service 7 0.34%




Same Age as Parents of Opposing Party 5 0.24%
Prior Civil Litigant 4 0.20%
Insufficiently Concerned about Relative Who Was Victim of
Crime 3 0.15%
Did Not Own a Gun 2 0.10%
From New York 2 0.10%
Homosexual 2 0.10%
Living Unmarried with Significant Other 2 0.10%
Pregnant 2 0.10%
Same Build as Opposing Party 2 0.10%
Situated in Courtroom Near Opposing Party's "People" 2 0.10%
Welfare Recipient 2 0.10%
Background in the Martial Arts 1 0.05%
Financial Troubles 1 0.05%
From Texas 1 0.05%
Inner City Person 1 0.05%
No Military Service 1 0.05%
Read "Rolling Stone" Magazine 1 0.05%
Too Much Education 1 0.05%





The reader can, of course, examine Table III-S and form his or her
own conclusion about whether lawyers are truly serving their clients' iriter-
ests by removing these groups of venirepersons, or whether the whole busi-
ness of striking people from participation on the jury on these grounds is at
the least silly, if not offensive. In fact, there have been some studies done
that suggest that trial lawyers are not very successful at identifying favorable
and unfavorable jurors during jury selection. 44 Accordingly, one might
legitimately question whether the stereotypes evidenced in Table III-S indi-
cate more about the biases of the venirepersons in those groups or the
biases of the attorneys who exercised those peremptory challenges. 145
Ultimately, however, the issue is not the accuracy of these group ste-
reotypes; the issue is the denial of participation on juries to these individu-
als.146 It has previously been suggested that the Batson line of cases can
only be accurately understood as focusing primarily upon the rights ofju-
rors to nondiscriminatory selection procedures. 47 But it is unimaginable
that the Court would have sacrificed the rights of litigants to impartial ju-
ries merely to diversify those juries. It is also very unlikely that Batson is
predicated on the very questionable proposition that race or gender is ir-
relevant to the performance and verdicts of jurors. 48 Instead, the only
persuasive predicate for the Batson rule requires a distinction between the
goals of the litigants and the goals of the system. Litigants seek to secure
favorable jurors; the system seeks to provide fair and impartial juries.
When Batson ended the previously unfettered regime of the peremptory
challenge, the rights ofjurors did not ascend to a position superior to the
litigants' right to a fair and impartialjury. The rights ofjurors were merely
elevated above the previously unencumbered practice of attempting to se-
cure the most favorable juries possible for litigants.
One of the lessons of the Batson line of cases is that the peremptory
challenge, no matter which litigant exercises it, is an action created and
endorsed by the state.1 49 Because the state's only legitimate interests are to
provide the litigants with fair and impartial juries and to provide potential
jurors with selection procedures that are not unfairly discriminatory, the
interest of litigants in securing.the most favorable jurors should be an irrel-
evant consideration. Thus, when one examines the list contained in Table
HI-S, that list should be measured, not by whether a rational lawyer might,
in some circumstances, wish to exclude such individuals from particular
juries, but rather by whether a system which allows such individuals to serve
on juries has somehow failed in its duty to provide litigants with fair and
144 See, e.g., Hochman, supranote 81, at 1396-97; Broderick, supra note 5, at 413; Hans Zeisel &
Shari Seidman Diamond, The Effect of Peremptory Challenges on Jury and Verdict: An Experiment in a
Federal District Court, 30 STAN. L. RE V. 491, 517 (1978).
145 See Brown et al., supra note 115, at 232-33.
146 Broderick, supra note 5, at 411.
147 See supra notes 49-64 and accompanying text.
148 Consider again, for example, the public opinion polls demonstrating substantial discrep-
ancies, based upon race, in the perception of the guilt or innocence of 0. J. Simpson. See supra
note 43. By contrast, other than gender (which is now an illegal basis for peremptory challenges)
there do not appear to be any similar poll results for any case based on any of the group distinc-
tions listed in Table r-S.
149 See supra note 56.
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impartial triers of fact. If a system allowing challenges for cause is adminis-
tered sensibly and without the carelessness engendered by the peremptory
challenge safety net, unfair biases should be eliminated to the extent possi-
ble without resort to peremptory challenges.' 5 0 That is not to say that no
biases will be present. The fact is that nobody is truly unbiased. 51 But
shared group beliefs are not the same things as unfair biases.' 52 The value
of the jury largely depends upon the representation of various group be-
liefs, which itself diminishes the impact of any unfair biases. 153 It is actually
the peremptory challenge that distorts this balance by allowing the removal
of some of these group beliefs.154
Although this conclusion has not specifically been articulated by the
Supreme Court in the Batson line of cases, it would appear to be a necessary
premise of the Batson rule. That rule is surely not predicated upon the
disclaimer that there exist no group beliefs associated with race or gender.
Nor is it based upon the superiority of the rights ofjurors over the fair trial
rights of litigants. It would seem to follow, then, that at least in cases in
which race or gender are the grounds for peremptory exclusion, the Court
has implicitly concluded that the group beliefs associated with race and
gender do not unfairly prejudice the litigants' rights to impartial juries.155
It would also seem to follow that, if the group beliefs associated with race
and gender do not unfairly prejudice the litigants' rights to impartial ju-
ries, then the exclusion of individuals from jury service on the basis of race
or gender violates the state's other prime directive: the provision of poten-
tial jurors with jury selection procedures that are not unfairly
discriminatory.
Of course, the Supreme Court has not sought to vindicate the legiti-
mate state interests injury selection; that is not the Court's function. The
Court has necessarily been restricted to addressing the constitutional suffi-
ciency of the peremptory challenge, specifically the limited extent to which
the peremptory challenge fails to pass muster under the Equal Protection
Clause. It is for this reason that the Court has thus far only limited the
peremptory challenge in its application to race and gender, and has explic-
itly endorsed, as a matter of constitutional scrutiny, the use of peremptory
challenges on the basis of group stereotypes not mandating heightened
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. 156 But for any legislative or
rule-making authority considering the future vitality of the peremptory
challenge, the arena is not so limited. Beyond the perimeters of the lim-
ited scrutiny permitted under the Equal Protection Clause, there is no rea-
150 Note, Peremptory Challenges and the Meaning of Jury Representation, 89 YALE LJ. 1177, 1182
(1980).
151 See, e.g., VAN DYKE, supra note 43, at 160, 162; Zeisel & Diamond, supra note 144, at 531.
152 Hochman, supra note 81, at 1396; Broderick, supra note 5, at 411.
153 VAN DyKE, supra note 43, at 160, 162; Kuhn, supra note 4, at 245-46.
154 VAN DYKE, supra note 43, at 162; Morehead, supra note 110, at 639; Broderick, supra note 5,
at 371.
155 Indeed, the Court has explicitly acknowledged that the rights ofjurors to nondiscrimina-
tory selection procedures must be balanced against the importance of the peremptory challenge
in providing litigants with fair trials, not favorablejurors. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex reL T.B., 114 S. Ct.
1419, 1426 (1994).
156 Id. at 1429. The heightened scrutiny afforded to race and gender is justified because of
the long history of discrimination in this country against blacks and women. Id. at 1425.
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son to distinguish between race and gender as opposed to the host of
group stereotypes listed in Table III-S.157 That is not to say that all, or even
any, of the groups in Table III-S have suffered discrimination of a kind
commensurate with race or sex discrimination. It is to say, however, that in
advancing the goals of impartial juries and fair selection procedures, his-
tory need not be a limiting principle.1 58
Whichever groups are removed, even if only in some cases and by
some litigants, the exclusion from jury service because of group stereotyp-
ing brands the excluded group members as inferior, 59 insults individuals
by reducing their worth as jurors to a cosmetic or trivial characteristic, 160
makes underrepresented groups less accepting of the court system and its
results,' 61 and injures society as a whole by frustrating the ideal of equal
citizen participation in the jury process. 162 Even beyond race and gender,
the effects on the representativeness of juries are apparent. For example,
empirical data demonstrates that both the young and the old are under-
represented on juries,163 and Table III-S confirms that peremptory chal-
lenges have at least contributed to that undesirable circumstance.
Moreover, some of the currently accepted bases for peremptory challenges,
such as economic and geographic criteria,'6 have a disproportionate im-
pact upon certain racial groups.'
65
In short, for all of the reasons that race- and gender-based peremptory
challenges do not advance any legitimate interests in impartial juries that
outweigh the jurors' right to nondiscriminatory selection procedures, per-
emptory challenges exercised on the basis of the group stereotypes in Ta-
ble HI-S suffer by the same comparison. The costs in terms of the rights of
potential jurors and the loss of representative juries is significant. Any gain
in'terms of fairer or more impartial juries is certainly not apparent from an
examination of the data in Table HI-S. And any "gain" in terms of the
litigants' private interests in gaining more, favorable factfinders simply de-
serves no consideration.
There remains the second category of peremptory challenges: those
based upon the subjective judgments of the attorneys. One of the defenses
advanced on behalf of the peremptory challenge has been that it allows
lawyers to exercise intuitive strikes, acting on the basis of hunches. 66 The
data indicates, however, that such subjective judgments accounted for less
than four percent of the explanations tabulated.' 67 Nevertheless, Table III-
157 See Underwood, supra note 42, at 763; Saltzburg & Powers, supra note 4, at 364, 372.
158 Even the heightened scrutiny of the Equal Protection Clause extends to racial discrimina-
tion against whites and sex discrimination against men, e.g., J. E. B., 114 S. Ct. at 1430, suggesting
that, even for equal protection purposes, there is something objectionable about such group
stereotypes even in the absence of a long history of discrimination against the particular targeted
groups.
159 Kuhn, supra note 4, at 247.
160 Bray, supra note 47, at 568.
161 Kuhn, supra note 4, at 246.
162 Broderick, supra note 5, at 417; Kuhn, supra note 4, at 246-47.
163 VAN Dn, supra note 43, at 35.
164 See supra Tables HI-H and lH-K.
165 See Kuhn, supra note 4, at 239, 313.
166 See, e.g., Satzburg & Powers, supra note 4, at 341 n.21.
167 See supra Table DI-R.
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Unfavorable Impression 36 24.83%
Seemed Unintelligent 25 17.24%
Assertive 11 7.59%
Attempting to Reach Better Juror 7 4.83%
Liberal or Lenient 6 4.14%
Will Not Understand Evidence, Issues or Law 6 4.14%
Eager to Serve 3 2.07%
Would Be Better in Upcoming Case 3 2.07%
Emotional 2 1.38%
Total 145 100.00%
These explanations are even more vulnerable to criticism than the
group stereotypes contained in Table III-S. Initially, the subcategories in
Table III-T all suffer from being hopelessly vague and conclusory, which
surely are inherent characteristics of subjective judgments. But given the
doubtful capacity of lawyers accurately to assess venirepersons generally, 68
one can hardly be confident in those assessments in circumstances where
the lawyer can offer nothing (not even a stereotype) in support of that
assessment.169
But even assuming that these subjective judgments have been accu-
rately made, these subcategories still suffer from the same flaws as the
group stereotypes in Table III-S. Given the legitimate goals of a judicial
system in the selection ofjurors, there is simply no good reason to believe
that a system fails in its obligation to provide litigants with fair and impar-
tial jurors simply because it fails to permit the exclusion of persons who
are, for example, timid or assertive or eager or emotional or liberal.
IV. CONCLUSION
The peremptory challenge has outlived its usefulness. It originated at
a time when there existed no effective means of screening venireper-
sons. 170 With regard to the two legitimate goals of providing litigants with
fair and impartial juries and providing potential jurors with fair and non-
discriminatory selection procedures, it is entirely counterproductive.
168 See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
169 Compare, for example, some of the specific facts advanced in support of the proposition
that particular venirepersons lacked the intelligence or education to serve listed supra Table m-J,
with the unsupported allegations thatjurors "seemed unintelligent" or "will not understand [the]
evidence, issues or law" supra Table III-T.




What should be the end for the peremptory challenge began, ironi-
cally, with the Supreme Court's decision in Batson. This death knell was
not sounded because Batson has effectively circumscribed race- and gender-
based peremptory challenges; toward that end, Batson is almost surely a
failure. Instead, Batson has, almost inadvertently, demonstrated a number
of truisms that support the extermination of the peremptory challenge.
First, Batson has focused our attention, or at least resurrected our at-
tention, upon the rights of citizens to be treated fairly in -the jury selection
process. Second, Batson has forced us to recognize that the right to an
impartial jury is something quite different from the nonexistent "right" to a
favorable jury. Third, Batson as applied in the lower courts has demon-
strated the futility of simultaneously attempting to preserve the essential
character of the peremptory challenge and to redefine "discrimination" in
such a way as to prohibit the exercise of peremptory challenges on the basis
of certain group stereotypes. Thus far, efforts to accomplish both of these
goals have produced enormous, and with regard to the evaluation of prof-
fered neutral explanations, hopelessly irremediable inconsistency. In that
regard, Batson may yet compel us to choose between returning to a system
of unfettered peremptory strikes and doing completely away with the per-
emptory challenge. Fourth, because of the burdens associated with the res-
olution of Batson challenges, Batson has unwittingly contributed to the
campaign for the latter choice; Batson proceedings are necessarily inciden-
tal only to peremptory challenges and are further costs of maintaining that
institution.
Finally, Batson has provided us with the first opportunity to examine
the reasons lawyers use peremptory challenges, and what has emerged is
the legal version of the emperor's new clothes. Stripped of its mystique,
the peremptory challenge turns out in large part to have operated as an
excuse for the inadequate functioning of the challenge for cause. It has
also been revealed to be the refuge for some of the silliest, and sometimes
nastiest, stereotypes our society has been able to invent. Many of the judg-
ments used by lawyers in the exercise of peremptory challenges look not
unlike those of a child in a candy store with a pocketful of change and a
commitment to leave the store without any cash. It is time for the peremp-
tory challenge to go. It will not be missed.
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